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ABSTRACT 
‗If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them?‘ (Rosenhan, 1973, p.250). 
This question, posed almost 40 years ago, continues to pervade mental health 
debates and polarise opinion. The current research explores how unusual beliefs 
are negotiated and constructed by individuals in a non-clinical population. I 
considered this from the perspective of individuals who endorse conspiracy 
theories (‗belief holders‘) as well as a friend, family member or partner. Previous 
research indicates that ‗insanity‘ is often identified and constructed by systems 
around a person rather than by the person themselves. By taking this approach, I 
aimed to elucidate the intra- and inter-personal negotiation of claims from two 
different perspectives. Each belief holder and a self-selected friend, family 
member or partner were interviewed together to examine the intra- and inter-
personal negotiation of claims, how claims were constructed by those around the 
belief holder and how emotions associated with claims were managed. Grounded 
theory was used to analyse the data. 
 
Two core-categories were developed from the data; ‗discovering and managing a 
new world‘ and ‗experiencing and negotiating claims with others‘. The first core-
category focused on the intra-individual experience of claims, exploring how 
these were discovered, experienced and integrated into participants‘ sense of 
themselves and their identities. The second core-category explored the inter-
personal negotiation of claims, how claims were constructed by those closest to 
belief holders and the strategies developed by participants to negotiate claims in 
diverse social contexts. Both core-categories were complementary, with many 
processes running in parallel between the two. A model of how participants 
experienced and negotiated claims was developed, combining the two core-
categories and explicating the relationships between the two. The clinical and 
research implications of the findings are explored.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Almost 40 years ago, in his seminal work into the validity of psychiatric 
diagnoses, Rosenhan asked; ‗if sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know 
them?‘ (Rosenhan, 1973, p.250). This question has continued to pervade mental 
health debates and is central to this research. If the line between ‗sanity‘1 and 
‗madness‘ is not as clear-cut as psychiatric labels imply, why is it that some 
people receive diagnoses such as ‗schizophrenia‘ whilst others negotiate 
identities as ‗eccentrics‘ (Weeks & James, 1995)?  
 
This investigation aims to explore the accounts of people who endorse minority 
reality claims2 within the general population. By considering the intra- and inter-
personal negotiation of claims in a non-clinical sample, it is anticipated that this 
research will elucidate understandings of the boundaries between sanity and 
‗insanity‘. Whilst the focus is on a non-clinical population, this research has been 
developed specifically with mental health service-users in mind. Research into 
the personal and social negotiation of ‗unusual beliefs‘ in a non-clinical sample 
may have important implications for service-users, offering insights into strategies 
to manage and negotiate beliefs labelled as delusions. On a broader level, 
research such as this may illuminate some of the challenges highlighted by 
Rosenhan‘s (1973) question and the difficulties associated with categorical 
approaches to psychiatric diagnosis.  
 
In addition to ‗belief holder‘3 participants, this research focuses on the 
interpersonal construction of claims through the inclusion of a friend, family 
member or partner (FFMP). One possible answer to Rosenhan‘s (1973) question 
regarding the nature of sanity and insanity might be that madness is identified 
                     
1
 Inverted commas will be used throughout to indicate an awareness of the use of problematic 
terminology. Inverted commas will only be used when problematic terms are used for the first 
time.  
2
 The term minority reality claim is used where possible to describe the worldview endorsed by 
participants. This term was adopted as many participants in this research objected to the use of 
terms such as conspiracy theories or unusual beliefs since they felt that this undermined the 
validity of their ideas.  
 
3
 Belief holder will be used as a shorthand term to denote participants who endorsed minority 
reality claims. Whilst the problematic nature of the term belief holder is recognised, it is used for 
the purposes of brevity.  
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and labelled by those around the person considered ‗mad‘. Thus, when 
considering the boundaries between sanity and insanity, it seems pertinent to 
also explore constructions of unusual beliefs from the perspective of those 
closest to the belief holder. How do individuals with alternative worldviews 
negotiate their ideas and what impact does this have on the people around them? 
This research aims to explore the experience of endorsing and negotiating 
minority reality claims from the perspective of the belief holder as well as a 
FFMP.  
 
In this chapter I will begin by reviewing current psychiatric and psychological 
approaches to delusions. Subsequently, I aim to explore some of the difficulties 
with psychiatric and psychological approaches, making links between these 
problems and the present investigation. I will then discuss both the context of and 
literature on conspiracy theories and other unusual beliefs from a non-clinical 
perspective. I will then relate conspiracy research to clinical research on 
delusions. Finally I will summarise the research presented and discuss the 
rationale for, and questions guiding, this investigation.  
 
Literature search 
A literature search was conducted on the following databases: SAGE journals 
(2002-2012), Science Direct (2002-2012), PsycINFO (2002-2012), 
PsycARTICLES (2002-2012), CINAHL (2002-2012) and Google Scholar (2002-
2012). The following search terms were used combined with Boolean operators 
AND/OR; non-clinical, general population, delusion, unusual belief, psychosis, 
continuum, family, duration of untreated illness, help seeking, interpersonal, 
coping, discourse, social construction. Where searches resulted in 500 or more 
papers, subject terms/keyword searches were used to limit the results. Relevant 
papers were identified initially through reading the title then reviewing abstracts 
and the paper itself if deemed relevant. Relevance was determined on the basis 
that papers focused on unusual beliefs (or delusions) in clinical and/or general 
populations.  Searches were conducted for the period 2002-2012 as it was 
inferred that research published between these dates would be building on 
existing theories. Older papers were then identified by reviewing references cited 
within the literature. This enabled the identification of relevant historical literature 
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as well as ensuring that current literature formed the focus of the search. Citation 
searches were conducted on particularly relevant papers to enable the 
identification of other relevant literature. 
 
Psychiatric approaches 
Psychiatric constructions of the boundary between sanity and insanity rely upon 
categorical diagnoses such as schizophrenia. Thus, madness is identified 
through the recognition and labelling of symptoms which are assumed to reflect 
underlying pathology. Yet, as Rosenhan‘s (1973) research demonstrated, the 
labelling of pathology is somewhat more complex than simplistic categories of 
diagnosis may imply. In this section, I will examine unusual beliefs by exploring 
how delusions have been constructed and the influences on this process. I will 
also explore the questions raised by psychiatric research and consider criticisms 
of diagnostic approaches.  
 
Psychiatric constructions of delusions 
Since the focus of this research is on unusual beliefs, I will concentrate on the 
construction of delusions and associated psychotic diagnoses such as 
schizophrenia. Within DSM-IV, delusions are considered one of the ‗positive 
symptoms‘ associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Crow, 1980). Palmer 
(2000) asserted that delusions are present within over 75 psychiatric disorders, 
leading some to argue that delusions are ‗central psychiatric concepts‘ 
(Georgaca, 2000). DSM-IV defines a delusion as:  
 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is 
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible proof or evidence to the 
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of 
the person‘s culture or subculture (APA, 1994). 
 
Despite the primacy of delusions within psychiatric diagnoses (Georgaca, 2000), 
upon reading the diagnostic classification, it is unclear how individuals considered 
‗delusional‘ are differentiated from those labelled eccentric or ‗conspiracy 
theorists‘. For example, conspiracy theories are, arguably, beliefs which are 
4 
 
sustained despite mainstream opposition, considered false by most people and 
are maintained irrespective of what is considered incontrovertible evidence of 
falsity by the majority of society. This raises the question as to why some people 
are labelled delusional yet others with beliefs which appear to meet diagnostic 
criteria are not. The following section focuses on psychiatric approaches to 
answering this question. 
 
The key features of delusions outlined by DSM-IV and emphasised throughout 
research are falsity, conviction, incorrigibility and cultural aberration. This 
construction of delusions arguably promotes judgement on a categorical basis i.e. 
the presence or absence of ‗symptoms‘ and has contributed to a largely bio-
deterministic research and treatment focus (Georgaca, 2004; Palmer, 2000). 
Indeed, medical understandings have principally been based on the idea that 
delusions are a symptom of an underlying biological brain disorder such as 
schizophrenia. Various genetic studies have attempted to explore the link 
between genes and diagnoses such as schizophrenia; however, to date, genetic 
research has largely failed to produce consistent evidence of the genotypes 
implicated in schizophrenia (Bentall, 2004; Lowenstein, 2009).  Lowenstein 
(2009) argued that lack of knowledge in this area, in addition to the inability to 
affect genes, should preclude further research. Yet such research continues (e.g. 
Andreasen, Wilcox, Epping, Ziebell, Zein, Weiss et al., 2011). If it is possible to 
explain the development of ‗syndromes‘ such as schizophrenia through 
genotypes, it raises questions about how some people who hold unusual ideas, 
but do not access mental health services, are understood. Perhaps their 
experiences would be perceived as a lesser expression of an underlying genetic 
condition.  It appears that instead of addressing these questions, genetic 
research primarily focuses on people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
disregards any experience resembling this within the general population. This 
focus on the ‗pathological‘ maintains the supremacy of biological processes and 
allows limited insight into the psychological and social processes which may 
determine how people are labelled as mad or ‗psychotic‘.  
 
In addition to genetic studies, psychiatric research has focused on neural 
substrates responsible for the development of psychosis. The hypothesis that 
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abnormalities in dopamine levels are causal to psychosis has been an enduring 
idea within psychiatry (Howes & Kapur, 2009). Howes and Kapur (2009) chart the 
history of the ‗dopamine hypothesis‘, assimilating the research and proposing a 
third version of the theory. The dopamine hypothesis has various guises but 
essentially states that an excess of dopamine within the brain is causal to 
psychosis. Howes and Kapur (2009) argued that various pathways lead to 
dopamine dysregulation within the brain, asserting that dopamine is the ‗final 
common pathway to psychosis‘ (Howes and Kapur, 2009, p.557). Models 
proposing that neural substrates are almost exclusively responsible for the 
development of symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions fail to account for 
the presence of these experiences within community populations (e.g. Romme & 
Esher, 1989). Do non-clinical samples experience dopamine dysregulation in an 
attenuated form or is another process responsible for these experiences? Despite 
proposing that dopamine abnormalities are causal to psychosis, Howes and 
Kapur (2009) fail to provide an explanation for the presence of ‗sub-clinical‘ 
psychosis within their model. Failure to consider non-clinical populations is 
common in research focusing on the dopamine hypothesis of psychosis; this 
approach leaves fundamental questions about the prevalence of psychotic-like 
experiences in the general population unanswered.  
 
The notion of ‗insight‘ remains central to psychiatric understandings of delusions 
as well as other mental health problems. David (1990) characterises insight as an 
awareness of illness, the ability to recognise psychotic experiences as a sign of 
pathology and compliance with treatment. This definition is readily accepted 
within psychiatric communities (e.g. Gillett, 1994), with clinicians working to 
enhance insight in order to improve outcomes such as hospital admissions 
(Gillett, 1994). However, the measurement of insight is contingent on clinician 
rather than service-user judgement (Hamilton & Roper, 2006). Literature on 
insight seemingly disregards the powerful position of the clinician in judging 
whether a service-user is considered to possess, or lack, insight. In addition, it 
assumes universal agreement over constructs such as schizophrenia and insight. 
Hamilton and Roper (2006) argued that service users‘ rejection of psychiatric 
labels presents a threat to clinician and researcher authority. They infer that 
clinicians and researchers respond to this threat by colonising service-user 
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experience, framing rejection of diagnosis as lack of insight and therefore 
reflective of underlying pathology (Hamilton & Roper, 2006).  
 
The reification of insight in psychiatric research and practice leaves many difficult 
questions unanswered. How is insight defined? Is there universal agreement on 
what constitutes the possession or lack of insight? Is the language of insight 
available to everyone or used only by certain privileged groups? In the context of 
this investigation it appears unclear how people who endorse unusual beliefs in 
the general population would be constructed in terms of insight. It seems unlikely 
that individuals endorsing conspiracy theories would consider their beliefs 
delusional. This leads to questions about whether they would be considered to 
lack insight and therefore be in need of psychiatric input.  
 
Psychological theory 
In contrast to psychiatric approaches, psychological research and practice has 
largely rejected unified diagnostic constructs such as schizophrenia, instead 
focusing on individual aspects of experience. The rejection of labels such as 
schizophrenia has been based upon the heterogeneity of symptom expression 
and the lack of reliability regarding clinician diagnosis (Bentall, 2004). In the light 
of these (and other) criticisms, many proponents have advocated a dimensional 
approach to psychiatric diagnoses (Bentall, 2004), acknowledging a continuum of 
experience between clinical and non-clinical populations (Strauss, 1969). To 
explore how individuals, and those around them, are able to manage alternative 
beliefs without seeking psychiatric input, it is necessary to understand how 
psychological theories might construct such individuals.  
 
Since psychological theories largely focus on single symptoms, (Freeman & 
Garety, 2000) the following sections will primarily focus on research into 
delusions. The research discussed here broadly consists of models concerning 
the development, maintenance and treatment of delusions, and research 
attempting to account for the continuum of experience of unusual beliefs between 
clinical and non-clinical populations.  
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Cognitive models 
Within psychological theory and practice, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
for psychosis, with its large and robust evidence base, has become the dominant 
approach. A single-symptom approach has been adopted within most CBT for 
psychosis research (Freeman & Garety, 2000).  
 
Maher‘s (1974) conceptualisation of delusions being attempts to make sense of 
anomalous experiences has pervaded cognitive theory and arguably remains the 
central tenet of cognitive research. Indeed, the notion that delusions are based 
on an interaction between internal and external experiences and incorrect 
reasoning is integral to most dominant cognitive theories (Bentall, 2004; 
Freeman, Garety, Fowler, Kuipers, Bebbington & Dunn, 2004; Morrison, 2001). 
Thus, if applied in the context of a non-clinical population, it may be inferred that 
similar aberrant reasoning processes contribute to the development of unusual 
beliefs. Yet it appears unclear which aspects of the theory account for the division 
between clinical and non-clinical populations. Is it the internal and external 
experiences which differ or could it be reasoning biases that differentiate these 
groups?  
 
Several broad multifactorial models have been developed, synthesising previous 
cognitive research, to explain the development and maintenance of delusions 
(e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; Morrison, 2001). Morrison‘s (2001) model suggested 
that delusions arise from culturally unacceptable misinterpretations of intrusions 
into awareness which are maintained by faulty self and social knowledge derived 
from life experiences. Other models emphasise different processes but similarly 
point to reasoning biases in the development and maintenance of delusions 
(Freeman et al., 2004). The idiosyncratic nature of cognitive models of delusions 
(Morrison, 2001) may, in part, explain the variation between clinical and non-
clinical populations. It could be postulated that reasoning biases (Garety, 1991) 
contribute to the development of unusual beliefs within non-clinical populations 
and that processes such as self and social knowledge and cultural acceptability 
(Morrison, 2001) determine the impact on functioning and levels of distress 
experienced. This would mean the same processes would be implicated in the 
development and maintenance of unusual beliefs within the general population 
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and delusions within the psychiatric population; however, those in the general 
population would hold different interpretations of their beliefs activating different 
cognitive, affective, behavioural and physiological processes. Whilst cognitive 
models may offer some explanation of the differences between clinical and non-
clinical belief processes, they seem somewhat limited. For every question 
cognitive theories answer, many more are raised such as who decides what is 
culturally unacceptable? What processes are involved in the transformation of a 
person with culturally unacceptable beliefs to a person with delusions? 
Individuals rarely identify their beliefs as delusions (deHaan, Welborn, Kirkke & 
Linzen, 2004) yet cognitive models appear to ignore the process of identification 
and labelling, emphasising instead internal processes. The identification and 
labelling of delusions is explored later in this chapter.  
 
Research has been conducted to investigate cognitive approaches in non-clinical 
populations. For example, Freeman, Pugh & Garety (2008) investigated the 
jumping to conclusions bias in a non-clinical sample. The researchers found that 
this bias was present in 20% of their non-clinical sample and was associated with 
‗paranoid‘ thoughts. Cognitive research in non-clinical populations has been cited 
in support of the notion of a continuum of experience between clinical and non-
clinical populations (Lincoln, 2007). Yet it appears unclear why individuals 
reporting paranoid thoughts and demonstrating identical jumping to conclusion 
biases remain in the non-clinical population. The usefulness of this research is 
limited as basic questions remain overlooked. For example, knowledge that some 
individuals in both general and psychiatric populations ‗jump to conclusions‘ and 
that this tendency is correlated with self-reported unusual beliefs appears to 
ignore basic questions such as what processes or experiences differentiate 
clinical and non-clinical populations? The question posed by Rosenhan (1973) 
remains as relevant today as it was 40 years ago. 
 
Continuum theories 
Despite a presence within research literature charting over 100 years (Peters, 
2001), the notion that symptoms of psychosis are continuously distributed within 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Strauss, 1969) has only recently been taken 
seriously. A number of theories concerning individual differences have been 
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developed to account for the continuum of experience of unusual beliefs within 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999; Verdoux & 
van Os, 2002). Much of the continuum literature has been written by researchers 
who are also interested in cognitive models of delusions. Thus, a reciprocal 
relationship between continuum theories and cognitive theory has developed 
(Campbell & Morrison, 2007).  
 
Peters et al. (1999) developed the Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) to measure 
the prevalence of delusional ideation within the general population. The authors 
found that a significant number of people within the general population held 
beliefs that were identical to those of a clinical population. However, it was the 
levels of distress and preoccupation associated with the beliefs which 
differentiated the clinical from non-clinical participants, with clinical participants 
experiencing more distress and preoccupation concerning their beliefs (Peters et 
al., 1999). These findings have been replicated across cultures (Verdoux , 
Maurice-Tison, Gay, van Os, Salamon & Bourgeois, 1998) and religious groups 
(Smith, Riley & Peters, 2009). Such research suggests that it is not the belief per 
se but the appraisal, distress and preoccupation which determines whether 
someone‘s perspective is considered problematic. 
 
Cognitive and continuum researchers have increasingly been incorporating 
interpersonal factors into conceptualisations of psychosis. Through exploring 
unusual beliefs within clinical and non-clinical populations, Campbell and 
Morrison (2007) argued that a key difference between clinical and non-clinical 
groups was levels of cultural acceptability and appraisals of harm. The authors 
suggest that the clinical sample held less culturally acceptable beliefs and 
appraised harm as more likely than the non-clinical sample. Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith, Rollinson, Fowler et al. (2005) conducted an internet survey 
into suspiciousness, distress and coping strategies within a general population 
sample. They argued that suspicious thoughts were a common occurrence for 
most people but that such ideas were distributed hierarchically with interpersonal 
suspiciousness at the lowest and most common level and conspiracy involving 
organisations and severe personal threat at the highest and least common level. 
They further argued that withholding feelings from others was associated with 
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higher levels of paranoia. Boyd and Gumley (2007) similarly explored the 
experience of paranoia and postulated that social isolation contributed to the 
worsening of paranoia as well as a perception of threats as external and 
interpersonal. Such continuum research appears to compliment cognitive theory, 
providing a research basis for ‗normalisation‘ (Kingdon & Turkington, 1994) of 
unusual beliefs and integrating interpersonal factors into models of the 
development and maintenance of delusions. However, the interpersonal factors 
explored are limited to negative experiences such as isolation from others, 
experiences of interpersonal suspiciousness and social rejection due to the 
culturally unacceptable nature of ideas. What appears to be neglected within this 
research is the voice of those surrounding the person with unusual beliefs. Are all 
interpersonal experiences regarding beliefs exclusively negative and excluding 
and is this different in non-clinical populations? How are unusual beliefs 
appraised and negotiated by others and does this differ between those close to 
individuals within the psychiatric and general population? 
 
Psychological research advocating a continuum approach to experiences 
proclaims that this explanation is less pathologising and enables experiences to 
be normalised (Turkington, Kingdon & Weiden, 2006). It appears instead though, 
that the notion of a continuum of experience promotes a polarity between ‗normal‘ 
and ‗abnormal‘ ends of the spectrum. Indeed, there must be a threshold at which 
a person tips from normal to abnormal although it is unclear about what criteria 
must be satisfied, other than absence of contact with mental health services, to 
remain at the normal end. Further, explanations offered from a cognitive 
perspective focus on faulty thinking (e.g. Morrison, 2001), prioritising individual 
accounts at the expense of broader systemic influences. Such research 
indicates, at the very least, that normality and rationality are complex constructs, 
with many people simultaneously being considered normal and rational yet also 
endorsing seemingly irrational ideas.  
 
Evidence that identical beliefs exist within both clinical and non-clinical 
populations has inspired this research. Yet the explanations for the differences 
between clinical and non-clinical groups offered by some psychological theories 
seem somewhat simplistic. For example, according to Freeman et al.‘s (2005) 
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hierarchical model, conspiracy involving organisations is at the highest and least 
common level yet conspiracies regarding government organisations are prevalent 
within the general population (Goertzel, 1994; Kay, 2011). Many questions 
remain unanswered including at what point a person‘s beliefs are considered 
problematic and who makes this decision. These and other questions are 
addressed below. 
 
Criticisms of dominant psychological approaches 
Despite attempts to address problems inherent within broad, unified constructs 
such as schizophrenia, Harper (2004) argued that the majority of psychological 
research and theory has failed to address the problematic features inherent to 
psychiatric labels. Arguably, the reification of delusions silences opposition 
through alignment with psychiatric and therefore scientific taxonomy and 
appealing to the notion that there is a common understanding about what is 
acceptable to believe; an idea based on dubious foundations. The following 
section outlines some of the criticisms of traditional psychiatric and psychological 
approaches to research and practice concerning delusions, highlighting the links 
with, and rationale for, the present investigation. 
 
Abnormality: A contentious construct 
Central to much psychological research is the notion of a continuum from 
normality to abnormality; sanity to insanity. Synonymous with normality is the 
notion of rationality and that normal people are rational (Crowe, 2000; Georgaca, 
2004). Yet few attempts have been made to define or measure the rationality of 
normal individuals (Georgaca, 2004). General population surveys demonstrate 
high rates of endorsement of unusual ideas such as paranormal phenomena 
(Gallup Poll, 1995). Thus, if individuals considered ‗normal‘ and ‗rational‘ endorse 
ideas constructed as irrational then arguably the assumed correspondence 
between insanity and irrationality is questionable. Therefore what, if not 
irrationality, leads a person to be diagnosed as delusional?  
 
 
 
 
12 
 
The role of the diagnostician  
Heise (1988) argued that when conflicts arise over beliefs coming from different 
epistemological positions, it is the powerful who decide what constitutes reality. 
However, the interactional nature of diagnostic decisions and the active role of 
the clinician are systematically ignored in mainstream psychiatric and 
psychological literature (Georgaca, 2004). Heise (1988) asserted that the 
judgement of pathology is based on an ascription of meaning which is legitimised 
by power and embodied within face-to-face interaction. Palmer (2000) argued 
that since irrationality is constructed within a social context, then it is this process, 
rather than an individual‘s pathology, that merits further exploration. Indeed, 
Heise (1988) discussed the dialectical process of delusion identification, arguing 
that social power determines which party‘s thinking is reified and which is 
stigmatised, with the ‗deficient‘ party being subject to social control. Drawing on 
examples of unconventional belief systems, Palmer (2000) argued that it is not 
the belief but the negotiation of the belief in a context of power that is the key 
factor in decisions regarding pathology. This research is interesting in the context 
of the present investigation since it highlights the importance of the social 
negotiation of beliefs. If it is not the belief itself but how it is negotiated that is 
critical to decisions regarding pathology, then it would be interesting to discover 
how people with unusual beliefs who are not labelled as delusional socially 
negotiate their beliefs.  
 
The nature of truth 
Heise (1988) argued that the label of delusion arises when a person 
demonstrates a lack of ‗social commitment‘ through the expression of ideas that 
are not widely shared. Within western societies, truth is legitimised through 
scientific enquiry which is embedded within a realist epistemology. Heise (1988) 
argued that truth and reality obtain significance through systems of knowledge 
and learned concepts. Thus, cultures or subcultures with different epistemological 
positions may treat knowledge and understandings from competing systems with 
incredulity (Heise, 1988). Therefore, determination of truth and what constitutes 
meaningful and credible information sources can vary according to the 
epistemological position adopted within different cultural groups. Heise (1988) 
argued that this creates problems for clinicians when attempting to determine the 
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veracity of claims since notions of truth are contingent on a particular ideology 
which can vary within and between cultures.  
 
Aird, Scott, McGrath, Najman and Al Mumun (2010) discussed the social shift 
from traditional religious to new age thought. The authors proposed that the 
increasing acceptance of new age thought may explain high rates of delusion-like 
experiences within the general population (Aird et al., 2010). However, if social 
belief systems are changing, what impact does this have on the construction of 
unusual beliefs? It appears that there may be a dichotomy between professional 
knowledge based on scientific enquiry and a growing social knowledge based on 
new age thought (Aird et al., 2010). This seems to pose yet another problem to 
the process of differentiating madness from sanity. 
 
Rhetoric and practice: Epistemological inconsistencies 
There are assumed to be differences between lay and psychiatric interpretations 
of madness. However, such differences appear fragmentary when the process of 
psychiatric diagnosis is explored. Rather than rigorous, scientific approaches to 
diagnosis, psychiatrists adopt tacit skills and ‗common sense‘ to identify 
delusions (Harper, 2004; Palmer, 2000). Through adopting a naively realist 
position, exponents sidestep the difficult issue of how decisions regarding the 
veracity of claims are made (Harper, 2004). Harper (2004) argued that there is an 
inequality in the threshold required for claims to be considered valid, with service 
users being significantly disadvantaged and psychiatrists rarely investigating the 
empirical basis of claims. Heise (1988) reasoned that without taking an 
epistemological position, psychiatrists could not be using falsity as a criterion for 
diagnosis and therefore must rely on the extent to which claims maintain ‗social 
currency‘. As previously discussed, the very notion of truth and reality is 
contentious, yet this difficulty is ignored within clinical practice. This raises 
interesting questions about how people within the general population maintain 
minority reality claims which often do not have social currency or accord with 
common sense understandings, yet are not labelled as mad.  
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Conviction and incorrigibility 
Georgaca (2000) argued that since the content of delusions have been 
demonstrated to be present within both clinical and non-clinical populations (e.g. 
Peters et al., 1999) and determining ‗truth‘ within the context of a conversation is 
problematic, then research should focus on levels of conviction and incorrigibility 
since these factors differentiate clinical from non-clinical groups. Through 
interviews with people diagnosed as delusional, Georgaca (2000) contended that 
individuals drew on culturally prevalent discursive devices to legitimise claims 
and that they were meaningful and negotiated within the context of the 
interaction. Garety (1985) argued that beliefs considered delusions are not held 
with absolute conviction but instead change across time and contexts. If 
delusions are neither based on culturally aberrant ideas nor held with absolute 
conviction, then arguably the standard against which diagnostic decisions are 
made and the validity of the delusion construct is questionable. Such ideas 
highlight the potential oversimplification of psychiatric research into delusions and 
raise questions about what it is that differentiates the delusional from the non-
delusional. 
 
Contextualising experiences 
Cromby and Harper (2009) argued that dominant models of psychosis are largely 
decontextualized and offer, at most, tokenistic acknowledgement of 
environmental factors whilst maintaining the primacy of cognition. For example, 
despite an acknowledgement of the interpersonal nature of paranoia and the 
impact of social isolation on experiences, Boyd and Gumley (2007) continued to 
privilege the role of cognition, suggesting that paranoia was primarily constructed 
in the ‗imaginations‘ of participants. Cromby and Harper (2009) emphasised the 
social, material and relational aspects of paranoia, arguing that ‗acute‘ states are 
created within dialectical exchange of perception and the social, material and 
relational circumstances of a person‘s life. In contextualising people‘s 
experiences, rather than focusing on intra-individual, cognitive processes, 
broader questions about the material, relational and social aspects of experience 
are illuminated. If social and economic factors influence the likelihood of receiving 
a mental health diagnosis, then perhaps differences between clinical and non-
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clinical populations who endorse identical minority reality claims are reflected in 
the social and economic systems around the individual.  
 
Interpersonal context       
Researchers consistently point to the social negotiation of unusual beliefs and 
how beliefs are transformed into delusions and madness through conflicts over 
reality (Heise, 1988). Yet despite the ubiquitous threat of having beliefs reduced 
to insanity (Heise, 1988), many people are able to endorse minority reality claims 
without being constructed as mad by those around them (Peters et al., 1999). 
Palmer (2000) further suggested that since mental health problems such as 
psychosis are labelled socially, explorations of this interpersonal exchange are 
vital to understand the way in which madness is constructed. Smith (1978) 
explored the construction of mental illness and argued that despite an absence of 
clarity regarding what deviation from which norm classifies someone as mentally 
ill, verbal descriptions can powerfully illustrate a picture of mental disturbance in 
the mind of another. Smith (1978) pointed to the process in which discursively 
‗mental illness‘ becomes reified leading prior and subsequent constructions to be 
interpreted exclusively through this lens. Thus, despite an apparent intangible 
quality, mental illness can be effectively constructed through a variety of 
discursive devices (Smith, 1978). Mercer (1995) argued that the distinction 
between what is acceptable and what is not acceptable to say is learned socially 
and abided by to avoid labels of eccentricity or madness. What is unclear is the 
extent to which the ambiguity surrounding the construct of mental illness 
promotes caution when people discuss minority reality claims. This investigation 
aims to explore how people negotiate unusual beliefs and the extent to which 
caution is exercised when sharing ideas.  
 
A number of researchers have identified the role of the system around the 
individual in constructing beliefs as unusual and the subsequent seeking of help 
from mental health services (deHaan et al., 2004). Research in this area largely 
assumes that the ‗duration of untreated psychosis‘ should be minimised to ensure 
better outcomes (Bergner, Leiner, Cartner, Franz, Thompson & Compton, 2008). 
Thus, research has focused on how systems around a person diagnosed with 
psychosis came to identify symptoms and barriers to treatment initiation (Bergner 
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et al., 2008). deHaan, Peters, Dingemans, Wouters and Linszen (2002) argued 
that people with psychosis often do not recognise their experiences as being 
indicative of mental illness and therefore the role of family members and friends 
is critical in the process of help seeking and treatment initiation. For 91% of 
deHaan et al.‘s (2002) sample, those around the individual were central to 
treatment initiation. Many other researchers have highlighted the integral role of 
the family and system around the individual in identifying psychosis and initiating 
help seeking (Judge, Perkins, Nieri & Penn, 2005; O‘Callaghan, Turner, Renwick, 
Jackson, Sutton, Folley et al., 2010; Wong, 2007). 
 
Judge et al. (2010) suggested that most individuals did not notice the behavioural 
and cognitive changes associated with the development of their psychosis. Thus, 
if individuals were not aware of changes, perhaps caregivers interpret and 
construct changes as being indicative of mental illness (Judge et al., 2010). 
Qualitative research charting entry to mental health services suggests that 
caregivers seek support from friends and informal social networks, with contact 
with mental health services being the last resort (Corcoran, Gerson, Sills-Shahar, 
Nickou, McGlashan, Malaspina et al., 2007; Wong, 2007). This apparent 
reluctance to contact mental health services and construct a family member‘s 
behaviour as pathological has been linked to the stigma associated with mental 
illness (Tanskanene, Morant, Hinton, Lloyd-Evans, Crosby, Killaspy et al., 2011). 
The reticence to access services could imply that initially, distress is located in 
the system around the person expressing unusual ideas or experiences and only 
when difficulties become acute is a decision made to access mental health 
services. Such research raises again the question of how unusual beliefs are 
constructed by people around belief holders in the general population. Are people 
close to belief holders concerned about their claims? Do belief holders 
experience emotional and social difficulties in relation to claims and how is this 
managed by themselves and those around them? These questions are examined 
by this research with the aim of explicating the constructions of people close to 
belief holders in the general population. 
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Conspiracy theories 
This research aims to explore unusual beliefs within the general population. To 
narrow this broad focus, I chose to recruit people who endorsed conspiracy 
theories. The following sections explore definitions of conspiracy, the context of 
conspiracy within Western cultures and conspiracy research.  
 
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham (2010) defined conspiracy theories as 
―lay beliefs that attribute the ultimate cause of an event or the concealment of an 
event from public knowledge, to a secret, unlawful and malevolent plot by 
multiple actors working together‖ (p.759). Conspiracy theories can be broad and 
wide ranging. Several writers have commented on the meta-nature of many 
conspiracies, incorporating seemingly diverse events into broad narratives in 
which each conspiracy supports and provides evidence for another (Goertzel, 
1994; Kay, 2011; Swami et al., 2010). It has been suggested that individuals who 
endorse one conspiracy are likely to endorse multiple conspiracies (Goertzel, 
1994; Swami et al., 2010); leading Goertzel (1994) to suggest that endorsement 
of conspiracies is a generalised ideological dimension. Within this research, 
although conspiracy theories formed the major focus, it seemed pertinent to 
adopt a loose interpretation of conspiracy due to the potential diversity of ideas. 
Thus, for the purpose of recruitment, conspiracy was defined as having an 
understanding or perspective that is not widely shared or may be marginalised in 
some way, for example, by the media or the government. People who identified 
as part of a specific religion or church were excluded since this generally 
represents an institutionalised network readily available to gain support and 
elaborate claims. Since often people labelled as delusional are socially isolated 
(ODPM, 2004), it was hoped that by excluding people who were part of religious 
groups, the accounts of participants would be considered more relevant to some 
mental health service-users.  
 
The context of conspiracy and links with ‗madness‘ 
Conspiracy theories are increasingly becoming part of the fabric of Western 
culture. The popularity and propagation of conspiracy is reflected in a broad 
range of media including books (with 10,413 books on Amazon with the word 
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‗conspiracy‘ in their title4), magazines, websites, radio programmes and even a 
television channel (Edge Media TV) devoted to revealing the ‗truth‘ behind 
diverse ―cover-ups‖ from 9/11 to extra-terrestrial activity. Such ideas are further 
popularised by films, ensuring that knowledge of conspiracy remains firmly within 
the Western psyche. Arguably 9/11 proved pivotal for the development and 
propagation of conspiracy theories; Kay (2011) wrote ‗when skyscrapers 
crumble…we demand a grander narrative than mere chaos, and grander villains 
than mere criminals and lunatics‘ (p.Xiii). Goertzel (1994) conducted a random 
general population survey measuring endorsement of conspiracy theories, finding 
that most people believe one conspiracy is at least partially true, with only 6.2% 
of the sample not endorsing any conspiracy theories. Yet widespread 
condemnation of conspiracies remains.  
 
In a similar manner to diagnostic decisions regarding delusions, conspiracy 
theories are often discounted on the basis of common sense rather than 
systematic investigation into the claims. Aaronovitch (2009) exemplifies this 
scepticism, writing ‗I was therefore sure, without even scrutinising it, that Kevin‘s 
evidence was wrong‘ (p.2). Conspiracy theories are often dismissed, 
marginalised and ridiculed by the media and politicians. Perhaps as a result of 
such stigma, there remains a reticence within the general population to openly 
endorse interpretations outside of mainstream accounts (Freeman et al., 2005; 
Wooffitt, 1992) due to the risk of being labelled and ostracised (Heise, 1988).  
 
Talking about conspiracies is undoubtedly somewhat of a social risk. Within our 
culture, there is a prevailing sense of scepticism towards ideas that challenge 
common sense understandings of the world (Wooffitt, 1992). However, not all 
conspiracies are considered the same. Some appear to have more social 
currency than others and are possibly met with less scepticism or rejection (e.g. 
9/11 conspiracies have been popularised through several documentaries perhaps 
enabling some social sanctioning of the debate). Wooffitt (1992) contended that 
by endorsing interpretations outside of mainstream accounts, a person positions 
                     
4
 ―Conspiracy‖ typed into book search in www.amazon.co.uk on 25
th
 April 2012 
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themselves inauspiciously in relation to others and risks labels of psychological 
deficit.  
 
The link between conspiracy and delusional beliefs or paranoia has been 
diversely conceptualised within both clinical (Freeman et al., 2005; Oltmanns, 
1988) and non-clinical research (Aaronovitch, 2009; Kay, 2011; Wooffitt, 1992). 
However, in practice, there are very real differences between having your ideas 
labelled as unusual or conspiratorial and being labelled as delusional. The 
question of how it is that some people are labelled as conspiracy theorists whilst 
others receive labels such as ‗paranoid schizophrenic‘ and ‗delusional‘ remains 
variously conceptualised but, as already discussed, remains largely unanswered. 
The varied conceptualisations perhaps reflect the complex and dynamic nature of 
understanding and labelling the beliefs held by others. Within this research, I 
hope to acknowledge, rather than minimise, this complexity and aim to add to 
understandings about how people who endorse minority reality claims remain 
within the general rather than psychiatric population. 
 
Within much of the literature on conspiracies, writers remain firmly aligned to 
interpretations of events promoted by the media and government (e.g. 
Aaronovitch, 2009; Goertzel, 1994). In a discussion about parapsychology, 
Wooffitt and Allistone (2005) discussed the resistance within research, and in 
particular psychological communities, to accept that parapsychology has any 
scientific credibility. Wooffitt and Allistone (2005) argued that a discursive, 
constructionist approach to research into unusual beliefs liberates researchers 
from the need to adopt a position on the ontological status of claims. Instead 
researchers can focus on how individuals negotiate beliefs within a cultural 
context of scepticism towards ideas that challenge scientific and common sense 
understandings of the world (Wooffitt, 1992). Wooffitt‘s (1992) position of 
ontological agnosticism seems relevant to this research since it would enable the 
focus to be on the experience and negotiation of ideas rather than the veracity of 
claims.  
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The present investigation 
This research will explore the experience of endorsing minority reality claims in 
the form of conspiracy theories from the perspective of a belief holder, along with 
a FFMP within the general population. Since research has suggested that it is 
largely the system rather than the individual who construct expressions of ideas 
as signs of pathology (deHaan et al., 2004), it is vital to explore the construction 
of those around belief holders within the general population. The inclusion of a 
FFMP aims to facilitate exploration of the interpersonal construction of beliefs. 
 
The rationale for studying a non-clinical population is to elucidate understandings 
of the experience and negotiation of unusual beliefs in the hope of expounding 
existing understandings of delusions. Many researchers have highlighted the 
importance of non-clinical investigations (Oltmanns, 1988; Harper, 2004). This 
research may have practical applications within clinical settings, allowing for the 
sharing of ideas about how others negotiate their ideas socially. Furthermore, in a 
study of experiences of psychosis, Dilks, Tasker and Wren (2010) highlighted the 
central importance of having a ‗normal life‘ as reported by service-users. 
Therefore, research that explores how people with similar beliefs negotiate a 
normal life appears to be important and relevant from a service-user perspective.  
 
As discussed, scepticism for beliefs outside the mainstream is common (Wooffitt, 
1992). Previous research has suggested that emotional experiences such as 
distress explain why some people‘s beliefs are considered delusional whereas 
others are not (Peters et al., 1999). If it is assumed that distress arises within the 
context of minority reality claims, then it is important to investigate how people 
not considered delusional manage the emotional aspects of their ideas and 
experiences. In addition, this research aims to explore how belief holders 
understand their belief system and presumably are able to refute the disbelief of 
others. 
 
Research questions 
How do individuals within the general population who endorse minority reality 
claims manage their beliefs on an intra- and inter-personal level? 
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How do friends, family members or partners of individuals who endorse minority 
reality claims understand the claims? 
How is any distress or conflict resulting from minority reality claims negotiated by 
belief holders and their friends, family members or partners? 
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METHOD 
 
In this chapter, I outline the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach to this 
investigation and my choice of grounded theory as a method of data analysis. In 
addition, I will provide an overview of the procedure and participants.  
 
Overview of approach  
I adopted a qualitative approach as I wanted to gather rich data regarding 
participant narratives and understandings of endorsing and negotiating minority 
reality claims. A qualitative approach was deemed most suitable for this since it 
enabled an open and flexible approach to data collection and analysis. A 
quantitative measure (the PDI, Peters et al., 2004) was also employed to 
contextualise this research in relation to previous work; enabling comparisons to 
be made between this and previous samples. Barker, Pistrang and Elliott (2002) 
advocated the combined use of qualitative and quantitative approaches within 
single research investigations. Whilst the inclusion of the PDI was deemed a 
useful method to contextualise the sample, I rejected the use of additional 
quantitative measures due to the of the lack of fit with my research aims. 
Previous research into non-clinical populations appeared somewhat dominated 
by approaches that emphasised individual experience explored largely through 
quantitative measures (e.g. Peters et al., 1999; Peters et al., 2004). The 
interpersonal context of claims was central to the research, being embedded with 
the inclusion of a friend, family member or partner as well as within the interview 
schedule. A qualitative approach therefore seemed to encompass the research 
aims, enabling a rich exploration of meanings and contexts.  
 
Other methods considered included Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) and discourse analysis. Larkin and Thompson (2012) described IPA as an 
approach that focuses on how people make sense of their experience through 
the use of phenomenological interpretative processes. Georgaca and Avdi (2012) 
described discourse analysis as a process of examining language in terms of 
construction and function. Since the primary focus of this research was on how 
claims were negotiated and constructed socially, the experiential focus of IPA 
and the exploration of discourses of discourse analysis did not fit the research 
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aims. Further, whilst both IPA and discourse analysis could have usefully been 
adopted in this research; I felt that grounded theory would enable me to develop 
a model that would have both clinical relevance and remain close to participants‘ 
accounts.  
 
Grounded theory 
I chose grounded theory as it enables a flexible, data-driven approach to analysis 
and provides a framework for developing a theory. The key determinants 
underlying my decision to adopt a grounded theory methodology included: 
- Grounded theory methods emphasise the exploration of social processes 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which seemed particularly relevant to my 
research aim to explore the interpersonal negotiation of minority reality 
claims.  
- Grounded theory enables researchers to develop a model, demonstrating 
relationships between categories. Whilst I did not intend to construct a 
theory generalisable across all contexts, I hoped that insights into the 
social and intrapersonal negotiation of beliefs might elucidate 
understandings pertinent to clinical research into delusions.  
-  Since the present investigation is novel, grounded theory was considered 
particularly useful as it enables a rich level of data analysis and does not 
require responses to be coded within preordained categories of interest. 
 
Whilst there are differences in how grounded theory has evolved under different 
epistemological paradigms, all approaches share certain characteristics (Oliver, 
2011), often adopting similar procedures (Dilks et al., 2010). Charmaz (2005) 
argued that a key strength of grounded theory was the provision of tools that 
could be flexibly applied to the process of analysis.  Charmaz (2006) proposed 
that rather than having prescriptive rules, grounded theory should be seen as 
offering researchers a set of principles and heuristic devices that can be adapted 
according to the researchers‘ needs. Common approaches to analysis include a 
move from open, or line-by-line, to focused coding, the use of memos to 
document connections across the data and emergent ideas, theoretical sampling 
and negative case analysis.  
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Willig (2008) argued that it is important to differentiate between full and 
‗abbreviated‘ versions of grounded theory. According to Willig (2008), in the full 
version, the researcher moves iteratively between data collection and analysis. 
The abbreviated version applies grounded theory principles to data that has 
already been collected. Willig (2008) argued that many important aspects of 
grounded theory methods are not utilised in this version. For example, theoretical 
sampling involves selectively collecting data on the basis of categories developed 
from previous stages of analysis (Willig, 2008) and is a key aspect of grounded 
theory not utilised within abbreviated versions. Willig (2008) suggested that 
abbreviated versions should be reserved for use only when time resources are 
limited. An abbreviated version of grounded theory was adopted for this research 
due to the time-limited nature of the study and available sample. Attention was 
paid to Willig‘s (2008) suggested ways to enhance the quality of grounded theory 
within abbreviated versions, for example, line-by-line coding is considered 
particularly important, enabling a depth of analysis to compensate for the lack of 
breadth associated with reliance on the original data set.  
 
Willig (2008) questioned the suitability of grounded theory for psychological 
research investigating the nature of experience arguing that methods were 
reduced to systematic categorisation techniques when not applied to the 
exploration of social processes. This was relevant to this investigation since 
whilst the focus was on the social negotiation of minority reality claims, the nature 
of the experience was also being investigated. Whilst Willig‘s (2008) critique was 
an important consideration, it seemed that grounded theory fitted my aim to 
investigate the social negotiation of minority reality claims. In addition, the 
development of a model or framework about what helped or hindered participants 
in the management and negotiation of their claims resonated with my desire for 
the research to remain relevant to service user populations.  
 
Epistemological position 
There is some debate and uncertainty regarding epistemological positions within 
qualitative methods perhaps owing to realist traditions ignoring epistemological 
questions and differences in language adopted to describe epistemological 
positions. Willig (2008) argued that the conceptual differences between the 
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original authors and later developments in the methodology contribute to a 
somewhat confusing picture regarding the philosophical position that underlies 
grounded theory. Chamberlain (1999) asserted that researchers must be clear 
about the premises underlying their approaches to grounded theory, explicating 
those that they endorse or reject. Thus, it is important for researchers to make 
their epistemological position explicit. Drawing from Harper (2012), I define my 
epistemological position as critical realist social constructionist being ontologically 
realist and epistemologically relativist. Therefore, I will assume that the data 
reflects something about the reality of living within British society at this time 
whilst remaining aware of how language as well as social, historical and cultural 
processes shape the construction of experience (Harper, 2012).  
 
A critical realist social constructionist position seemed helpful in exploring the 
meanings expressed by participants whilst recognising that any interpretation is 
likely to be influenced by the researcher, participant and context. The local and 
provisional nature of a relativist epistemology appeared to fit well with my 
understandings that rather than being static, unchanging and located within an 
individual, expressions of ideas labelled as ‗beliefs‘ are changeable and 
negotiated within a social context. The realist ontology underlying my approach 
appeared to enable me to acknowledge and remain aware of the powerful nature 
of labelling both within and outside of mental health services. Being seen as 
‗mad‘ has tangible impacts on people‘s lives including social exclusion, enforced 
medication and compulsory detention. It seemed important to adopt a position 
that was sensitive to this social process.  
 
Researcher reflexivity 
Since the epistemological position adopted highlights the inevitable influence of 
my perspective on the research, it seems important for me to articulate 
something about my experience and assumptions. Charmaz (2006) argued that 
researchers and participants are not objective, neutral arbitrators of an underlying 
reality but approach research with certain assumptions, knowledge and social 
status which impact upon the process. Charmaz (2006) asserted that whilst 
professional perspectives, interests and personal experiences all influence the 
research process, researchers should embrace such influences as a way of 
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developing ideas. Remaining open to and aware of such influences is integral to 
researcher reflexivity and facilitates a more transparent research process, 
enhancing the quality of the research. Thompson and Harper (2012) suggested 
that reflexivity involves critical consideration of the researcher‘s influence on the 
shape and interpretation of a study. Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) argued that 
there is a strong requirement for researchers to articulate the perspective from 
which they approached the data. Therefore, it seems pertinent to describe 
something about myself in order to enhance transparency. I am a 27 year old 
white British woman. Drawing on Charmaz‘s (2006) use of sensitising concepts, 
my experiences of training to be a clinical psychologist and working with mental 
health services with people with a diagnosis of psychosis has influenced the 
development and my approach to this research. My work with service users with 
a diagnosis of psychosis has taught me to be open and respectful towards ideas 
expressed that do not accord with my own sense of the world. With specific 
reference to conspiracy theories, I had some limited knowledge of popular 
conspiracies prior to starting this research. Prior to and throughout the research 
process, I attempted to adopt an agnostic position towards the ideas expressed. 
Being aware of my own opinions about the ideas expressed was integral to 
maintaining a reflexive stance. The use of a reflective diary as well as 
discussions in supervision and with peers helped alert me to the influence of my 
own ideas on the research. Further reflection about my influence over the 
research process is discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Use of the PDI 
I used the Peters et al. (2004) 21-item Delusion Inventory (PDI; Appendix 1) as a 
method of contextualising my sample. The PDI is an abbreviated version of a 
previous measure (PDI, Peters et al., 1999) designed to measure ‗delusional 
ideation‘ in non-clinical populations. In addition to delusional ideation, the PDI 
uses a 5-point Likert scale to measure how distressed participants are in relation 
to an item, how often they think about the item (preoccupation) and the extent to 
which they believe the item to be true (conviction). Peters et al. (2004) reported 
good internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The authors argued that their 
measure demonstrated good construct validity in that the questions related to 
positive symptomology associated with schizotypal diagnoses. In addition, validity 
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was measured through correlation with other scales based on similar constructs 
and the authors demonstrated convergent scores on similar scales (Peters et al., 
2004).  
 
The PDI was used with caution since, as previously discussed, the quantification 
of delusions is not unproblematic. Rather than using the PDI as way of reifying 
the construct of delusions, it was employed in response to the potential criticism 
that the experiences of this sample, and therefore the findings, are not 
comparable to a psychiatric population sample. In addition to contextualising this 
research, the PDI was also considered a potentially useful way to qualitatively 
explore some of the reported similarities and differences between clinical and 
non-clinical populations (Peters et al., 2004); for example, the content of beliefs 
as well as narratives about emotional experiences such as distress arising from 
claims.  
 
Ethics 
Ethical approval for this investigation was sought and granted from the University 
of East London School of Psychology Ethics Committee (see Appendix 2 for 
confirmation of this approval).  Distress as a result of the interview was a key 
ethical consideration. It was felt that the likelihood of distress would be low since 
the interview schedule was designed to be largely open and therefore directed by 
what participants wished to share. Distress was considered unlikely since previous 
research indicates that individuals within the general population who have 
experiences akin to those associated with diagnoses of psychosis are less 
distressed, and often find their unusual experiences or beliefs enriching and 
important aspects of their lives (e.g. Romme & Escher, 1989; Knight, 2005). The 
self-selection of participants and exclusion of people who had previously accessed 
mental health services was deemed to further limit the likelihood of significant 
distress. Finally, it was hoped that as I am a trainee clinical psychologist with 
experience of identifying and working with people in distress both in clinical and 
research contexts, any distress could be managed within the interview.  
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Participants  
Participants were self-identified belief holders from the general population and a 
friend, family member or partner. Inclusion criteria included: age of 18 years or 
older, had never received mental health services in relation to their beliefs nor 
were currently accessing mental health services and identification of a friend, 
partner or family member who was willing to be interviewed about the beliefs. 
Due to the time-limited nature of this investigation, a pragmatic approach was 
adopted to recruitment resulting in eight belief holder (one belief holder 
participant was interviewed twice with a different FFMP participant) and nine 
FFMP participants being recruited. 
 
Recruitment procedure 
Diverse methods were adopted to recruit participants. An advertisement was 
placed in a national newspaper (the Metro; Appendix 3), social networking sites 
and online forums (see Appendix 4 for a list of forums contacted). Participants 
were asked to contact me via email if they felt that they met the inclusion criteria 
and wished to participate. In addition, two London-based discussion groups were 
contacted who advertised themselves as being interested in conspiracy theories. 
I attended both groups and explained my research to members. I gave my 
contact details to interested members and encouraged them to contact me 
should they wish to participate. Perhaps due to the way in which the research 
was described and forums used to recruit, initial contact was made exclusively by 
belief holders as opposed to friends, family members or partners of belief 
holders. People who contacted me were given an information sheet and asked to 
identify a FFMP who had a good understanding of the minority reality claim that 
might be willing to participate. Over 25 potential belief holder participants made 
email contact about the research but subsequently declined participation largely 
on the basis of not being able to find a friend, family member or partner to be 
interviewed with.  
 
Belief holder participants who were able to identify someone to be interviewed 
with were asked to gain permission for me to contact interested friends, family 
members or partners directly about the research. In addition, I outlined the 
research and asked participants to confirm that their ideas seemed to fit with the 
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research aims. Interested friends, family members or partners were then 
contacted by me and given an information sheet. A mutually convenient time and 
place was then arranged to conduct the interviews.  
 
Eight of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and one via telephone. One 
participant, Glyn, was interviewed twice as, at the time of interview, he stated that 
there was someone else who was keen to be interviewed with him. As I had only 
collected limited data prior to the interview with Glyn and predicted difficulties in 
recruitment, I decided to interview him on a subsequent occasion. Limitations of 
interviewing Glyn twice are considered within the discussion chapter.  
 
Table 1 summarises belief holder participant demographics and recruitment 
method. Table 2 provides an outline of FFMP participant demographics and 
relationship to belief holder participants. One participant described their ethnicity 
as Indian, five participants described their ethnicity as ‗white other‘, and nine 
participants described their ethnicity as ‗white British‘5. The remaining two 
participants did not complete this information. Further information regarding the 
minority reality claim endorsed by belief holders is outlined at the start of the 
analysis chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
5
 Ethnicity has been reported here to protect confidentiality 
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Table 1: Overview of belief holder participant demographics 
Interview 
number 
Name 6 Recruitment 
method 
Gender Age7 
1 Adam Newspaper Male 61-65 
2 Roshan  Social 
network 
Male  26-30 
3 Liam  Online forum Male  51-55 
4 Glyn  Discussion 
group 
Male 46-50 
5 Paul Discussion 
group  
Male 51-55 
6 Glyn  Discussion 
group  
Male 46-50 
7 Tom  Discussion 
group  
Male 41-45 
8 Peter Social 
network 
Male 46-50 
9 Megan  Discussion 
group 
Female 66-70 
 
Table 2: Overview of FFMP participant demographics 
Interview 
number 
Name  Relationship 
to belief 
holder 
participant  
Gender Age 
1 Sarah Family 
member 
Female  36-40 
2 Matteo Friend  Male  26-30 
3 Alice Partner Female  31-35 
4 John  Friend  Male 21-25 
5 Jane  Friend  Female  41-45 
6 Aaron  Family 
member 
Male 21-25 
7 Olga Partner  Female  Missing  
8 Sue  Partner  Female  31-35 
9 Jack  Friend  Male  Missing  
 
Interview schedule and data collection 
I developed a semi-structured interview schedule for the purpose of the present 
investigation. The interview schedule was developed with the aim of exploring the 
experience of endorsing minority reality claims, whether any conflict or distress 
was experienced intra- or inter-personally as a result of the claims, how this was 
                     
6
 Names have been changed to preserve anonymity  
7
 Age ranges have been presented to preserve anonymity 
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managed and whether there were any challenges or difficulties in endorsing 
ideas considered different to wider social discourses. Questions for FFMP 
participants focused on whether they shared the claims, how they understood the 
claims and if there were any aspects of the claims that they found challenging or 
difficult. An overview of the interview schedule can be found in Appendix 5.  
 
To enable explorations of the minority reality claims within a relational context, all 
interviews were conducted conjointly with the belief holder and FFMP participant.  
It was hoped that the presence of the belief holder would ensure that they actively 
consented to discussions about them and their ideas. The right to have sections of 
the interview removed or to withdraw consent to participate at any time was 
emphasised to participants at the beginning of the interview. Prior to starting the 
interview, participants were asked if they had read the participant information sheet 
and if they had any questions. Participants were then asked to sign the consent 
form. Interviews lasted between 50 and 100 minutes and were recorded on a 
digital recording device. I transcribed all of the interviews, allocating a unique 
identifier to recordings and changing all identifying information. An adapted version 
the transcription conventions described by Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & 
Tindall (1994) was followed (see Appendix 6 for summary of conventions). 
 
In an attempt to limit its impact on the responses given during the interview, belief 
holder and FFMP participants were asked to complete the PDI at the end of the 
interview.  
 
Reflection on recruitment, interviews and analysis 
There are several ways in which I may have affected the interview process and 
subsequent data. From the outset, my status as a trainee clinical psychologist 
may have impacted the extent to which people were willing to participate or share 
ideas within the interviews. At one discussion group that I attended for 
recruitment purposes, several members asked questions about my motives for 
doing this research and stated that they thought I was planning to conclude that 
they were mad. In addition, some group members queried whether I might in fact 
be working for the government and therefore had a secret agenda to the 
research. Although I recruited one person from this group, it is likely that this had 
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an impact on the willingness of others to participate. In addition, prior to interview, 
several participants asked about my training and what I expected to find through 
interviewing them.  
 
I made email or telephone contact with all participants before the interviews and 
often had some knowledge of their minority reality claims. Whilst I did not 
specifically seek out information about conspiracies before the interviews, I had 
some prior knowledge of these. This will have impacted on the construction of the 
interview schedule as well as the questions asked during the interviews. For 
example, as I am more familiar with conspiracies regarding the events of 9/11, I 
may have asked less questions compared with conspiracies I was less familiar 
with. Charmaz (2006) argued that researchers cannot approach research topics 
assumption-free. Charmaz (2006) advocated a reflexive position on research 
topics, highlighting the importance of detailing professional knowledge as well as 
experiences and ideas that may impact on the investigation. I have therefore 
attempted to remain as open and reflective as possible throughout the interviews 
and analysis. 
 
The interviews themselves were diverse with varied descriptions of claims, 
approaches to negotiation and attitudes expressed by FFMP participants. The 
nature of participants meant that my role within the process was also varied. In 
some interviews, participants largely dictated what was discussed, speaking 
about claims with limited prompts other than about specific areas that I was 
interested in. In other interviews, I was more directive in the process through 
more stringent adherence to the interview schedule. This is likely to have affected 
the information shared by participants. 
 
I will have also influenced the data whilst engaging in the analysis. Discussions 
with my supervisor and peers helped me to remain open and reflective about my 
assumptions during the analysis. Memos also enhanced my ability to reflect on 
my thoughts and ideas throughout the research process. 
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Analysis procedure 
Whilst various revisions have been made to grounded theory since its inception, 
the procedures have remained fairly constant. However, the epistemological 
position and subsequent claims that may be made on the basis of a grounded 
theory have been contested by various researchers. As previously discussed, it is 
therefore important to be transparent about the epistemological position and 
analysis procedures adopted. This analysis largely drew on the grounded theory 
procedures described by Charmaz (2006) and adopted a critical realist social 
constructionist epistemology. 
  
Due to time limitations, it was only possible to transcribe each interview before 
conducting the next. The limitations of this abbreviated method of grounded 
theory have been discussed and are considered in my discussion. Whilst I was 
familiar with the ideas expressed in previous interviews through the process of 
conducting and transcribing them, analysis proper began after all the data was 
collected.  
 
I started the analysis by reading sequentially through the transcripts to further 
familiarise myself with the data. Any thoughts or reflections were recorded in 
memos. Line-by-line coding was used at the initial stage of analysis which 
involved developing short summaries of the ideas expressed within each line of 
the transcript (example of line-by-line coding in Appendix 7). Charmaz‘s (2006) 
‗code for coding‘ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 49) was followed which included remaining 
open to the data and creating simple codes using participants own words. Willig 
(2008) considered line-by-line coding important when using abbreviated versions 
of grounded theory since it enables a greater richness to the analysis.  
 
Following the initial line-by-line coding, focused coding was adopted (example of 
focused coding in Appendix 8). Charmaz (2006) described focused coding as 
both a method to sift through large quantities of data as well as synthesising 
ideas across the data. Charmaz (2006) recommended the use of gerunds in the 
coding process. I therefore used gerunds where possible in an attempt to 
preserve action and sequence (Charmaz, 2006). Tweed and Charmaz (2012) 
argued that focused codes should attempt to integrate lower level codes into 
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meaningful units. When developing focused codes, I attempted to construct 
codes that would transcend individual descriptions and interviews.  
 
The use of memos enabled further development of focused codes into categories 
and facilitated the development of links between categories. Memos were kept 
throughout the data collection and analysis process enabling me to reflect on the 
process of analysis and developing ideas. Charmaz (2006) highlighted the 
importance of memos, alerting the researcher to their preconceived ideas as well 
as forming the pivotal step between data collection and the development of a 
grounded theory. Charmaz (2006) argued that memos were a useful way of 
comparing data at all levels of the coding process. Memos were written 
throughout the analysis process (Appendix 9). Charmaz (2006) recommended 
that when developing categories, codes should be raised to categories within 
memos and the concept defined clearly including the conditions in which the 
category was present or absent and links to other categories.  
 
Charmaz (2006) advocated that subsequent to the development of preliminary 
categories, researchers should gather more data through the use of theoretical 
sampling. Since I adopted an abbreviated version of grounded theory, gathering 
more data was not possible. I therefore went back through the transcripts 
searching for exceptions to and examples and elaborations of categories. This is 
similar to Glaser and Stauss‘ (1967) constant comparative analysis. Memo writing 
enabled links to be made between data and categories as well as between 
categories and categories. Through this process the categories were gradually 
refined. With regard to their experience of grounded theory, Dilks et al. (2010) 
wrote that the development of categories involves a process of progressive 
abstraction until the data is summarised in as few categories as possible whilst 
still conceptually accounting for all of the data. Whilst arguably a grounded theory 
could be endless, the idea of a progressive abstraction of data into categories 
guided my analysis.  
 
Evaluating the quality of the research 
There is significant debate regarding how and the extent to which qualitative 
research can be evaluated. Spencer and Ritchie (2012) summarised the key 
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aspects of the debate including whether notions of evaluation traditionally 
associated with quantitative methods can be applied to qualitative methods and 
whether there can be broad qualitative evaluation criteria or if criteria should be 
specific to the method adopted. Broad criteria for evaluating qualitative research 
are explored here. 
 
Pidgeon and Henwood (1997) argued that traditionally, psychological research is 
evaluated by questions about reliability (i.e. replicability) and validity (i.e. 
correspondence between descriptors and what is being described) (Pidgeon & 
Henwood, 1997, p. 268). The authors argued for an approach to evaluation of 
research that is embedded within the assumptions underlying the research 
(Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). I have therefore attempted to make my 
epistemological assumptions explicit as well as highlight experiences and 
interests that may have influenced my approach to this investigation. Drawing on 
critical realist social constructionist assumptions, notions of reliability become 
redundant since the interaction of researcher, participants, context and resultant 
theories are considered unique.  
 
Cohen and Crabtree (2008) suggested broad evaluative criteria for all qualitative 
research. The authors argued that fundamental criteria for evaluating qualitative 
research included: ethical considerations, contribution of the research, clarity and 
coherence of report and the use of appropriate methods (Crabtree & Cohen, 
2008). Within this section I will define and explicate how some of these evaluative 
criteria were addressed in this research. Those criteria not discussed here will be 
explored further in the discussion chapter. Ethical considerations pertain to 
making a positive contribution to the knowledge base whilst avoiding harm to 
those involved in the research process. The ethical nature of this research was 
validated by an ethics board. The importance of the research may be evaluated 
according to its contribution to the knowledge base and pragmatic and theoretical 
utility (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008). Cohen and Crabtree (2008) suggested that the 
clarity and coherence of a report should be judged on the basis of the provision of 
a clear description of the questions underlying the research, description of 
background material, study design and rationale for choice of methodology. 
These criteria have been addressed throughout the report and will be further 
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explored within the discussion. The study design and choice of methodology has 
been described within this chapter and will be further explored within the 
discussion chapter. The final criteria considered fundamental by Cohen and 
Crabtree (2008) was an understandable and unexaggerated interpretation of the 
data. This has been addressed throughout the method, analysis and appendices 
with details of the process of analysis.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the participants‘ minority reality claims to provide a 
context to the extracts used to illustrate the grounded theory. I will present 
participants‘ PDI scores and draw comparisons with previous research. Finally, I 
will present my grounded theory of the data using participant quotes to illustrate 
the constructed categories.  
 
Overview of participant minority reality claims 
A short synopsis of belief holders‘ claims are presented here to contextualise 
extracts used within the grounded theory. 
 
Adam was interviewed with his daughter, Sarah. Adam believed that there was a 
significant ―UFO problem‖ being covered up by governments across the world. 
He previously volunteered as an alien investigator, visiting people who had 
witnessed UFOs or been abducted. Adam had concerns for future generations 
and believed that aliens were developing a hybrid race with humans. Sarah 
expressed an interest in aliens and reported witnessing a UFO. She said that she 
was sceptical about some evidence that Adam drew on to validate and elaborate 
his ideas but generally agreed that there is a UFO problem being covered up by 
the government and media. 
 
Roshan described his ideas as being based on a questioning, sceptical attitude 
towards official information sources. He was interviewed along with his friend, 
Matteo who stated that he shared Roshan‘s scepticism towards authorities. 
Roshan appeared reticent to draw firm conclusions about his beliefs but instead 
highlighted his distrust of official stories about events such as 9/11. He stated an 
inclination towards seeing governments and powerful organisations as 
malevolent institutions that manipulate and control public opinion. 
 
Glyn was interviewed twice, first with a friend, John and then with his son, Aaron. 
Glyn reported that his minority reality claims developed after seeing footage of 
9/11 and believing it to be organised by the US government to justify wars 
against oil-rich countries. Glyn believed that the power structure of the world is 
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pyramidal, with a few people at the top holding all the power and making 
decisions to manipulate and oppress ―the masses‖. Glyn also believed that aliens 
regularly visit the planet and this is covered up by the government and media. 
John appeared to agree with many of Glyn‘s ideas although was quiet throughout 
the interview, stating that he felt powerless to do anything. Aaron said that he 
agreed with Glyn‘s ideas about 9/11 but strongly disagreed that aliens visit the 
planet.  
 
Liam was interviewed with his partner, Alice. Liam and Alice appeared to share 
many of the same ideas although Alice reported being unconvinced that 9/11 was 
government orchestrated. Liam described his claims as being ―esoteric‖. He said 
that he questioned ―who benefits‖ whenever national or world events took place. 
Alice similarly stated that she questions the motives of powerful organisations 
when significant events occur. Both Liam and Alice said that they wrote for an 
alternative magazine that researches conspiracies. 
 
Paul was interviewed along with his friend Jane. Paul said that he had 
telepathically communicated with aliens for as long as he could remember. He 
reported seeing aliens as paternal in their relationship to humans, believing that 
they controlled major decisions made on earth. He described a longstanding 
distrust of the government, media and other powerful organisations. He said that 
events such as Princess Diana‘s death and 9/11 were government conspiracies. 
Jane said she had used telepathy for many years and was very interested in the 
occult. She reported being uncertain about whether there is an alien presence on 
earth.  
 
Tom was interviewed with his partner, Olga. Tom and Olga stated that they 
shared the same beliefs. They reported an interest in the work of David Icke 
although remained unsure about some of his ideas. Tom and Olga said that the 
government conspires against ordinary people in all aspects of their lives. They 
stated that both 9/11 and 7/7 were government-staged events. They reported that 
many solutions to problems such as the energy crisis and cancer are available 
but that the government supresses them.  
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Peter reported that the world was likely to significantly change in November 2011 
and will end in December 2012. He used the internet to research the movements 
of asteroids as well as the earth‘s path in space to support his ideas. His claims 
appeared further supported by the Mayan calendar which he said ends at the end 
of December 2012. He stated that aliens will arrive on the planet and to save 
some people who will then form a slave race on another planet. He said that 
governments do not publicise this information as they fear the population would 
panic if they were aware of the evidence. Peter‘s fiancée, Sue was interviewed 
with him. Sue stated that she was interested in Peter‘s ideas and did not discredit 
them, but believed that the world will not end, mostly as she does not want it to. 
 
Megan was interviewed via telephone with her friend Jack. Megan and Jack 
appeared to share many of the same views. Megan‘s ideas were largely drawn 
from David Icke‘s writing. She stated that the royal family are shape-shifting 
satanic reptilians that practice child sacrifice. She also reported that the 
government intentionally poison children through vaccinations and suppress 
cures for terminal illnesses. She said that she was active in her attempts to 
channel alternative energy sources and expose the ―lies‖ promulgated by the 
government and media. Jack stated that he shared many of Megan‘s ideas. He 
reported a particular interest in aliens and said that he had met a grey alien.  
 
PDI scores 
The individual PDI scores for the present sample are presented in Table 3. Two 
belief holder participants and four FFMP participants did not complete the PDI.  
Scores for ‗deluded‘ and general population samples from Peters et al. (2004) are 
reported in table 4 to provide comparison data.  
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Table 3: Present sample individual PDI scores 
Interview 
number 
Participant PDI total 
score8 
Distress9 Preoccupation 
 
Conviction 
1*10 Adam 4 4 5 18 
2* Roshan 5 8 9 15 
3* Liam 8 20 27 31 
4/6* Glyn 6 15.5 17 25 
5* Paul 9 9 12 23 
8* Peter 7 11 16 12 
9* Megan 11 15 27 55 
3 Alice 7 11 14 25 
4 John 8 13 11 0 
6 Aaron 1 1 1 2 
8 Sue 10 14 15 25 
9 Jack 11 13 11 0 
 
Table 4: Peters et al. (2004) sample PDI scores 
 PDI total 
score 
Mean (SD) 
and range 
Distress 
Mean (SD) 
and range 
Preoccupation 
Mean (SD) 
and range 
 
Conviction 
Mean (SD) 
and range 
Peters et al. 
(2004) general 
population 
sample 
 
6.7 (4.4), 
0-21 
 
15.5 (14.1), 
0-84 
 
15.4 (14.1), 
0-93 
 
20.4 (16.0), 
0-103 
Peters et al. 
(2004) deluded 
population 
sample 
 
11.9 (6.0), 
0-21 
 
36.7 (23.6), 
0-95 
 
36.1 (24.7), 
0-98 
 
44.5 (27.4), 
0-103 
                     
8 Indicates total number of items endorsed. As there are 21 items, scores could range between 
0-21. 
9 Distress, preoccupation and conviction were assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 0-5. 
Higher levels of distress, preoccupation an d conviction associated with ideas are indicated by a 
higher score. Scores could range from 0-105. 
10
 * indicates belief holder participant.  
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Due to the small sample size, statistically significant conclusions cannot be drawn 
from the data and only tentative observations can be made. The present sample 
scored lower on all factors when compared with the deluded sample in Peters et 
al.‘s (2004) research. The results indicate that the present sample scored 
comparably with the general population sample in Peters et al.‘s (2004) research. 
The exception to this pattern is Megan who scored comparably with Peters‘ et al. 
(2004) deluded sample on total score and conviction but lower on distress and 
preoccupation. This observation appears congruent with Peters‘ et al. (2004) 
argument that it is the levels of distress and preoccupation that differentiate 
clinical from non-clinical participants. 
 
Belief holder and FFMP participants scored similarly on the PDI total and distress 
scores. Belief holder participants‘ preoccupation and conviction scores were 
slightly higher than FFMP participants although were comparable with Peters et 
al.‘s (2004) general population sample. However, as discussed below, some 
participants did not complete all items which may explain the observed 
differences. Since it is not possible to complete statistical analysis due to the 
small sample size, scope to interpret such differences is limited. 
 
The comparable scores between participants in this research may be linked to 
the accepting attitude towards claims expressed by FFMP participants. In 
addition, FFMP participants often reported that they shared many of the claims 
which may also account for the similarity in scores. The overall low scores on 
distress may reflect participant descriptions during interviews of developing 
strategies to manage claims both intra- and inter-personally. The differences 
between scores of the present sample and Peters et al.‘s (2004) research may 
also reflect the small sample size. 
 
Finally, many participants found completion of the PDI very difficult, complaining 
about the wording of the questions. As a result, a number of participants refused 
to complete some items whilst others refused to complete the questionnaire 
altogether. For example, Jack did not complete the conviction rating, stating that 
it was obvious he believed that the item was true since he answered ‗yes‘ to the 
question. Thus, it was not possible to report a conviction score for Jack. Similarly, 
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other participants found it difficult to complete the likert scale of distress, 
preoccupation and conviction for all items which will have impacted on the 
reported scores. Some participants annotated the questionnaire, indicating that 
options were unacceptable in their current form. The difficulties reported by 
participants in the completion of the PDI may reflect broader challenges of 
attempts to quantify dynamic and often idiosyncratic constructs such as beliefs.  
 
Grounded theory 
The following section outlines the models developed from the interview data and 
description and elaboration of the categories. Two core categories were 
constructed; ‗discovering and managing a ‗new world‘‘ and ‗experiencing and 
negotiating claims with others‘. The categories reflect my interest in the intra- and 
inter-personal aspects of negotiating minority reality claims and therefore the line 
of questioning in the interviews. The categories are complementary, with parallels 
running between the processes described in both.  
 
Overview of model 
This section provides a brief overview of the models developed for the two core 
categories. At the end of the chapter, relationships between the categories will be 
explicated and one overall model presented. This research focused on the intra- 
and inter-personal experience and negotiation of conspiratorial beliefs. In 
addition, I examined FFMP participants‘ understandings and constructions of the 
beliefs and how distress or conflict is managed by claim endorsers as well as 
close others. Since most FFMP participants reported that they endorsed claims, 
extracts from both belief holder and FFMP participants are included in all areas of 
the models.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the first core category; ‗discovering and managing a ‗new 
world‘‘. Participants described their experiences leading up to the realisation that 
the world was not as they had been led to believe. This triggered a ‗questioning 
and searching for the truth‘ which further reinforced participants‘ sense that the 
world was not as it had previously appeared. Participants described the initial 
emotional impact of discovering the ‗truth‘ and subsequent attempts to link claims 
with their sense of self and previous experiences (‗storying claims and integrating 
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selfhood‘). Participants described several ways in which storying their claims 
seemed to enable them to manage the emotional impact of claims and reduced 
the intensity of associated distress. For some participants, reducing the distress 
associated with claims involved acknowledging and rejecting madness labels 
whilst for others, seeing distress as temporary and personally distancing selves 
from claims were important strategies. Participants described how the discovery 
of new knowledge and management of claims evolved over time from the 
moment of discovery through to the integration of claims into selfhood. This 
category is both impacted by and impacts on the second core category. For the 
purposes of clarity, this category will be presented initially in isolation from the 
second core category. Thus, only the intra-individual processes are explicated in 
figure 1. 
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Figure 1: „Discovering and managing a new world‟ 
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Figure 2 illustrates the second core category; ‗experiencing and negotiating 
claims with others‘. Participants described experiencing an initial dilemma 
regarding a desire to share their new knowledge about the world against a fear 
that they would be excluded. This was largely predicated on anticipated 
responses rather than encountered reactions of others. Participants described 
various ways that they tested claims with others. Some described testing claims 
in social broad social contexts, whilst others described initially sharing claims with 
close others.  ‗Scepticism and acceptance from close others‘ was described by 
belief holder participants retrospectively regarding attempts to share claims. 
FFMP participants described experiencing scepticism and acceptance from 
others over aspects of claims that they reported to share and also expressed 
scepticism and acceptance of aspects of claims not shared. Following 
experiences of testing claims, participants described how they had developed 
strategies to share claims. Participants described how experiences of social 
interactions impacted on the development of strategies to share claims (denoted 
by the continuous arrow at the bottom of the model). Participants described a 
variety of strategies employed to share claims in diverse social contexts. For 
some participants, not talking about claims was deemed the best way to avoid 
predicted negative responses to claims. Many participants also described how 
‗seeking and meeting likeminded others‘ provided them with a receptive outlet for 
ideas and supported them in developing strategies to share claims with others. 
Further links between the categories and subcategories will be explicated at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Figure 2: Experiencing and negotiating claims with others 
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CATEGORY 1: Discovering and managing a ‘new world’ 
This category concerns participants‘ discoveries of ‗new knowledge‘. The 
category also concerns how participants described managing the impact of 
claims emotionally and on their sense of identity and personal narrative 
(selfhood). This category is developed and elaborated through the subcategories 
‗discovering that the world is not what it seems‘, ‗questioning and searching for 
the truth‘, ‗emotional impact of new knowledge‘ and ‗storying claims and 
integrating selfhood‘. Subcategories (underlined titles) are summarised and 
illustrated using participant accounts below. Focused codes (italicised titles) are 
included to demonstrate the construction of subcategories from interview data. 
Where possible, the title of focused codes used participants‘ own words which 
will be indicated using speech marks. All focused codes were developed from 
data across two or more interviews.  
 
Discovering that the world is not what is seems 
Participants described the moment or point at which their view of the world was 
irreparably changed. As if lifting a mask, participants described an erosion of 
what they had been led to believe and an unmasking of the ‗truth‘. 
 
Glyn(BH11): … I just looked…they slowed the film [9/11 footage] and I 
looked and it was impossible, it was the emperor‘s new clothes, the 
king was naked, it was obvious that it was impossible (Glyn and John; 
44-4812) 
 
Tom(BH): …I soon twigged that the people behind 9/11, not just 
behind it but also helping with the cover-up <Louise: mmm> uh, which 
is mainly the job of the US government, um, these people, they‘re all 
connected in with the media as well and it‘s all a big club, you know? 
(Tom and Olga; 125-129) 
 
                     
11
 BH is used throughout to indicate that extracts were taken from belief holder participants.  
‗FFMP‘ will be placed next to names of FFMP participant quotes.  
12
 Indicates the interview and line numbers from which the extract was taken. 
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Glyn and Tom both articulate the realisation that the world is not what they had 
previously believed it to be. Both participants looked at footage of the events of 
9/11 and concluded that it was a government conspiracy. This moment or 
realisation led to a ―tumbling‖ of ideas and further revelations that the world was 
not what it had seemed: 
 
Glyn(BH): So they must have been lying, so I had to ask, why are they 
lying? <Louise: yeah> And that‘s where it all sort of started tumbling 
(Glyn and John; 49-52) 
 
Participants described diverse events leading them to suspect that the world was 
not as they had been led to believe. Whilst some participants cited a pivotal 
moment or event that precipitated their change in understanding, others talked of 
a cumulative gathering of information leading to the conclusion that things were 
not as they seemed. 
 
Roshan(BH):…Um I‘m always maybe suspicious of an agenda (.) 
what, I‘m being told something, what am I not being told. So I guess 
that, um, opens up possibilities to (.) let the imagination run free 
<Louise: mmm> and um, yeah, you know, I guess joining bits of 
information together and a combination of logic or imagination or 
whatever it might be… (Roshan and Matteo; 30-35) 
 
As if a lens through which the world is filtered, Roshan described suspiciousness 
permeating his processes of gathering information about the world. He seems to 
employ a somewhat idiosyncratic approach, drawing on both logic and 
imagination to develop his claims.  
 
Liam(BH): well, I think, one naturally, at least I started out pretty 
gullible, and, and, you know, I mentioned Santa Claus in a joking, but I 
think that sort of sets the tone for things that you believe to be 
absolutely, um, true, weren‘t (Liam and Alice; 49-52) 
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The realisation that Santa Claus is not real is a common childhood experience 
within Western cultures. It is interesting that such an event is cited by Liam as a 
precipitant to endorsing minority reality claims. Both Roshan and Liam‘s 
descriptions highlight the gradual nature of collecting information, drawing from 
seemingly everyday occurrences to conclude that dishonesty is widespread at all 
levels of society. What appears common to these extracts, and echoed across 
other participant accounts, is the sense that participants saw themselves as 
initially naive leading to the realisation that even seemingly benevolent acts had a 
malevolent undertone.  
 
For some participants, a significant life event led to their ‗moment of realisation‘: 
 
Megan(BH): …the big…catalyst for me was the opening the heart 
chakra [moment of spiritual awareness] when my daughter took her 
own life in 1993 <Louise: right> and it seemed that was the big 
traumatic experience that really did open the door, open the flood 
gates to a lot of first of all spiritual awareness… (Megan and Jack; 32-
37) 
 
For Megan, the traumatic experience of her daughter‘s suicide led to an opening 
of ―spiritual awareness‖. Megan seems to echo Glyn‘s expression of ideas 
―tumbling‖ following the moment of realisation. Janoff-Bulman and Berg (1998) 
suggested that disillusionment with previous conceptions of a benevolent, 
meaningful world is a common response to traumatic experiences. Perhaps for 
Megan, the experience of her daughter‘s suicide resulted in a shattering of her 
assumptions about the world and a reconstruction of a malevolent world in which 
her daughter‘s suicide could be seen as meaningful (Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 
1998). Megan later stated that she feels her daughter is ―cheering her on from the 
side-lines‖, creating meaning from her suicide and reinforcing her commitment to 
her new understanding of the world. 
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Questioning and searching for the truth 
Participants described a continuous process of questioning and searching for the 
truth. Time and accessing information sources were central to this process.  
 
Paul(BH):… yeah it takes up most of my time…I‘ll be up at 6 and I‘ll be 
doing between 1 and 2 hours writing in the morning before I even go to 
work <Louise: right> then I‘ll come home and I‘ll spend another 4/5 
hours researching online (Paul and Jane; 190-194) 
 
Validating claims personally 
For most participants, searching for the truth relied on an interrogation of 
evidence using science and logic to validate ideas.  
 
Tom(BH): …I am into conspiracies now, based on evidence <Louise: 
mmm> but, I‘m not into all conspiracies <Louise: mmm> because I 
look at the evidence and it doesn‘t convince me (Tom and Olga; 144-
146) 
 
Tom emphasised evidence as well as the importance of information being 
personally convincing. This idea resonates with Roshan‘s earlier description of an 
idiosyncratic approach to information gathering, drawing on both scientific and 
logical reasoning as well as less tangible, perspicacious abilities to validate 
claims. Many participants relied on intuition to validate information, perhaps 
owing to their distrust in mainstream information sources.  
 
Jane(FFMP): …as long as I can prove it to myself then I‘m fine, I don‘t 
need other people involved (Paul and Jane; 672-673) 
 
Megan(BH): …it‘s not that I need confirmation from other people 
<Louise: mmm> who‘ve done research…I‘ve dowsed [using a 
pendulum to gather unknown information] all, a lot of information 
myself…and that‘s how I‘ve found out quite a lot of um, um truth and 
lies <Louise: mmm> (laughs) and that to me is the best thing and the 
majority of my knowledge has come from my own higher self <Louise: 
51 
 
yeah, yeah> and I just find I can‘t deny that (Megan and Jack; 1316-
1325) 
 
Both Megan and Jane emphasised their own intuitive resources rather than 
relying on others to verify claims. There appeared to be a focus in many 
participant accounts on the undeniable nature of information that personally 
resonates with them. Whilst most mentioned scientific evidence being important 
to claims, it seemed that claims were only accepted when they were personally 
salient. In addition, it seems that through the process of questioning and 
searching for the truth, participants perceived an increase in their skills and 
abilities to discern the truth from the ―lies‖ promulgated by mainstream sources.  
 
Adam(BH): and then I started reading a lot < Louise: yeah> actually 
ended up as a UFO investigator < Louise: right>. Uh, I investigated 
several different close encounters that people had had… (Adam and 
Sarah; 67-69) 
 
Glyn‘s previous description of ideas ―tumbling‖ seems similar to the momentum in 
Adam‘s account. Reading lead to investigation and broadening his knowledge 
about aliens. 
 
Liam(BH): …and I‘ve had the good fortune of examining a lot of things 
like that, that people who are experts in that, in that field because I 
dabble in this area (Liam and Alice; 152-154) 
 
Similarly to Adam, Liam described how an interest in a particular area enabled 
him to elaborate his ideas through focusing his research. Both Adam and Liam 
cite information that most people would not have access to, positioning 
themselves in possession of expert knowledge perhaps with the intention of 
validating the veracity of their claims. Similarly, Jack relies on an unusual 
personal experience to validate the authenticity of his account: 
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Jack(BH): …I know aliens exist, I‘ve actually met one <Louise: mmm> 
I‘ve been in that situation so I know you can say what you like, you‘ve 
only been told, I‘ve experienced it (Megan and Jack; 808-810) 
 
Jack‘s description highlighted the authority that personal experience imbues 
claims with, providing a way of legitimising ideas in the face of scepticism. 
Through questioning and searching for the truth, participants‘ understandings of 
the world were elaborated and developed, further reinforcing a sense that the 
world is not what it previously seemed. In addition, some participants linked 
questioning and searching for the truth to privileged access to unique or specialist 
information. It appears that accessing specialist information serves a dual 
function of strengthening belief in claims personally and as a defence against 
scepticism interpersonally.  
 
Emotional impact of new knowledge  
Participants described a variety of emotional experiences arising from endorsing 
a worldview that does not fit mainstream accounts. Perhaps owing to the 
existential nature of the questions asked, participants described experiences of 
distress associated with claims: 
 
Olga(FFMP):… I became immediately very conscious that I am, my 
worldview is (.) going to be targeted <Louise: yeah> that my worldview 
is not the right one…in direct contrast and conflict <Louise: yeah> and 
that I was gonna, could be persecuted [by the government] really 
quickly <Louise: mmm> and I just sort of thought for a little bit, I had a 
real panic stations (Tom and Olga; 609-614) 
 
Olga describes a fear that her worldview could be targeted and of the potential for 
persecution. She highlights the temporal nature of her panic, stating that it was 
present ―for a little bit‖ rather than something that continues to characterise her 
emotional experiences.  
 
Alice(FFMP): it scares the shit out of me, it really does, I think it‘s, um, 
it is really scary <Louise: mmm> …and that, um, the people that are 
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supposed to be looking after us that we trust <Louise: mmm>, don‘t 
really give a toss about us <Louise: mmm> …I think that‘s the most 
terrifying idea of all <Louise: mmm> that we don‘t actually matter (Liam 
and Alice; 1182-1191) 
 
Alice‘s account echoes Olga‘s sense of fear but de-personalises the fear, 
suggesting that nobody matters to ―the people…looking after us‖, thus problems 
are not personalised. Both accounts suggest that it can be helpful to maintain 
personal distance from claims. It appears that although highly distressing, Olga 
achieved distance from ideas by perceiving her emotions as temporary and likely 
to diminish over time. The focus of Alice‘s, and many other participants‘ claims, 
revolved around how conspiracies were culturally endemic and affected all 
members of society rather than them personally. 
 
The distress associated with claims was problematic for many participants and 
something that needed to be resolved before they could share their ideas: 
 
Glyn(BH): …I know that my, I‘m too passionate at the moment 
<Louise: ok> I‘ve got to somehow work with that <Louise: yeah> um, 
because I get upset <Louise: ok>, and that‘s the problem (Glyn and 
John; 379-380) 
 
Similarly to Olga, Glyn described being ―too passionate at the moment‖, implying 
that being overly passionate about ideas is problematic but changes over time. 
 
Tom(BH): …then I probably hit about two months of depression 
<Louise: mmm> because, I was totally new to this so I thought no 
one‘s going to believe me, you know <Louise: mmm> if I talk to my 
friends and family, no one‘s going to believe me <Louise: mmm> and it 
really ate me up because I thought, people have got to know about this 
(Tom and Olga; 313-318) 
 
Tom described experiencing depression as a result of discovering a ‗new world‘ 
due to feeling that others needed to know yet predicting their disbelief. Again, the 
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time-limited nature of this experience was emphasised in this account, 
suggesting that strong emotional responses to claims fluctuate over time. Implicit 
within many participant accounts is the idea that emotionality is problematic, 
particularly in the context of sharing claims. This idea is explored further in 
category two. 
 
Links with minority reality claims, distress and madness were made by some 
participants: 
 
Paul(BH): …obviously yeah, you are wondering if it‘s [telepathic alien 
communication] your own madness, your own schizophrenia <Louise: 
yeah>… (Paul and Jane; 1418-1419) 
 
Paul explicitly questions whether his experiences are signs of schizophrenia, later 
concluding that they are not through discovery that others share his telepathic 
experiences. 
 
Roshan(BH): I wouldn‘t say it‘s a paranoia because I‘m not a paranoid 
person at all, not, oh big brother‘s watching me or someone‘s out to 
get me but, um, just to kind of be sort of a bit more open (Roshan and 
Matteo; 36-39) 
 
Perhaps in an attempt to allay the potential of reduction of his claims to paranoia, 
Roshan rejects possible labelling of his ideas or self as paranoid. Heise (1988) 
described the process through which ideas not widely shared could be reduced to 
madness when conflicts over reality occur. Paul and Roshan‘s evaluation of 
claims may attempt to negate others‘ judgements through their explicit 
acknowledgement and rejection of madness labels. 
 
A further way of negating strong emotional responses and madness appears to 
be through distancing self from claims: 
 
Peter(BH):…it can be very frightening <Louise: yeah> however, there‘s 
nothing we can do about it (Peter and Sue; 223-224) 
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Peter acknowledges the emotional impact of his ideas yet appears to diffuse this 
through positioning himself as powerless. There was a sense of distance in 
Peter‘s and many other participants‘ accounts - claims may be frightening but 
they are problems that face us all - even if the majority are unaware of them.  
 
Alice(FFMP):…it actually scares me once I get into it <Louise: mmm>  
I think oh my God, if I was to push a bit more with this, you know, if 
that‘s true and maybe that‘s true as well, and that‘s, that is actually 
terrifying <Louise: mmm> and I do think…that‘s a reason why some 
people go nuts. (Liam and Alice; 1225-1230) 
 
Alice talks about balancing a desire to know more with a fear that further 
knowledge may lead to madness. Thus, knowing when to stop researching, when 
ideas are becoming too much and the experience is encroaching on sanity 
seems a vital strategy which is described by a number of participants.  
 
Perhaps influenced by the questions asked during the interview, the majority of 
participants talked largely about the negative aspects of emotional experiences 
associated with claims. However, participants also emphasised their ability to 
manage negative emotional states. Participants described distancing themselves 
personally and emotionally from claims. The idea that we are all affected by 
conspiracies yet only a few are aware of the truth was central to participants‘ 
claims. Participant accounts reflect a sense that they have accessed privileged 
information and are therefore in possession of powerful knowledge. This 
specialist knowledge positions participants auspiciously in relation to the ‗ignorant 
masses‘ and may help to diminish negative feelings associated with claims. 
 
There was some explicit acknowledgement of the positive emotional experiences 
associated with claims: 
 
Alice(FFMP):… when you feel like you‘ve really uncovered something, 
when you feel like you‘ve really uncovered the truth <Louise: mmm> 
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it‘s kind of thrilling and it‘s terrifying as well (Liam and Alice; 1246-
1249) 
 
Alice described uncovering the truth about something as both thrilling and 
terrifying. This suggests that investing and researching into claims has positive as 
well as negative emotional consequences.  
 
Behavioural impact 
Two participants talked of moments where they became overwhelmed by ideas, 
leading them to feel compelled to tell others: 
 
Olga(FFMP): …I had a real panic stations <Louise: mmm, mmm>…I 
felt compelled to tell people <Louise: yeah> to such an extent that I 
actually, I actually one day um, stood up in the tube to tell people…and 
I told them that there is a police state and, and the war on terror is fake 
<Louise: mmm> something like that, I don‘t know what, exact, I can‘t 
remember exactly what I told them (Tom and Olga; 614-621) 
 
Olga described how, if not managed effectively, the emotional impact of claims 
can have significant ‗behavioural‘ consequences. Glyn similarly talked about how 
claims could become overwhelming, leading to him also to announce his ideas on 
a train: 
 
Glyn(BH): …I‘ve stood up on trains and done it <Aaron: he‘s weird> 
I‘ve just lost the plot a bit, it‘s been <Louise: mmm> it‘s been, you 
know, because I just think, people don‘t listen (Glyn and Aaron; 832-
835) 
 
Olga and Glyn described how the emotional aspects of claims led to a 
compulsion to tell others. Olga previously described feeling concerned about 
persecution and panicking about claims leading her to feel compelled to tell 
others about the police state. Glyn similarly described himself as being ―too 
passionate‖. It appears that overwhelming emotional experiences associated with 
claims can lead to behaviours such as proselytising to people on trains. Such 
57 
 
behaviour risks being labelled as ‗mad‘ by others, something deemed undesirable 
by all participants. It seems that an awareness of the emotional impact of claims 
is integral to managing and negotiating ideas.  
 
Storying claims and integrating selfhood 
The final process evident in participant accounts regarding the discovery of a 
‗new world‘ is storying ideas and integrating claims into selfhood. This 
subcategory explores how participants‘ sense of self and life experiences 
contribute to the endorsement of minority reality claims as well as the impact that 
claims have on a participants‘ life narratives. Participants described how they 
created coherence between their life story and claims and integrated claims into 
their sense of self and identity. 
 
Linking claims and life experiences 
Participants described attempts to fit claims into their life story. Integrating claims 
into a coherent narrative about the self seemed important even if participants had 
described themselves as previously unaware of alternative views of the world.  
 
Tom(BH): ..because even, you know, when I was younger, I always 
did have something about the truth <Louise: mmm> I really didn‘t like 
being lied to just in ordinary day, day life and um, so, when I, when 
these lies were on this massive scale <Louise: mmm> I, I was just 
really, really (.) really angry (Tom and Olga; 321-325) 
 
Tom previously described himself as a ―relative conservative‖ in his views and 
prior to the moment that he ―awoke‖, dismissing people with ―outrageous‖ views 
about conspiracies. On reflection, Tom describes how an aspect of himself, an 
interest in the truth, resonated with his perception of the lies about 9/11 leading to 
anger and a desire to find out more.  
 
Generally most participants saw beliefs as consistent with a sense of personal 
difference:  
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Olga(FFMP): yeah because for me, I‘ve always been a bit odd and a 
bit of an outsider (laughter) so, in a way, it hasn‘t really changed 
anything, at <Louise: mmm> in my, in my way of dealing with things or 
way of life (Tom and Olga; 828-831) 
 
Olga pointed to the potential impact that endorsing conspiracy theories could 
have on a person‘s life but how being ―an outsider‖ has limited the extent to which 
this happened for her.  
 
Roshan(BH): yeah and I think that‘s why I‘ve maybe had it from a very 
very early age being, not Caucasian <Louise: mmm> in a 
predominantly Caucasian society so always standing out, always 
being the odd one out…I think it does get into your consciousness 
and, and um, it certainly does have a role to play in that (Roshan and 
Matteo; 962-968) 
 
Roshan highlighted how his sense of difference contributed to his perception of 
the world. Both Olga and Roshan connected their sense of difference to a certain 
way of viewing the world, linking personal attributes with the propensity to 
endorse conspiracies.  
 
Participants also linked experiences growing up to a tendency to see the world 
differently: 
 
Paul(BH): I was also brought up in a traditional Christian household 
where mystical stuff is naturally part of life <Louise: right> it‘s the way 
my mum and dad brought me up; with Jesus and miracles and turning 
water into wine (Paul and Jane; 603-606) 
 
Paul described how his upbringing influenced his outlook on life, creating an open 
stance to alternative ways of viewing the world. Whether it is through an 
individual‘s sense of difference or family influences, most participants expressed 
a sense of continuity between life experiences and minority reality claims. It 
appeared that linking claims and life experiences also served a discursive 
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function for participants. By integrating claims into a personal chronology of 
experiences, the listener is slowly exposed to increasingly unusual ideas, with the 
speaker able to rationalise and explain each step. By slowly revealing claims, 
participants may also be able to gauge listeners‘ responses, adapting what they 
share in accordance with this feedback. 
 
“It does affect how you do things” 
Many participants pointed to the effect that endorsing claims had on their lives.  
 
Alice(FFMP):…I mean it‘s a hobby, it‘s something I‘m interested in, 
something Liam‘s interested in as well <Louise: mmm> but it does 
affect how you do things, it affects the choices you make (Liam and 
Alice; 1261-1265) 
 
Alice diminished the importance of claims by describing them as ―a hobby‖ yet 
simultaneously acknowledged the tangible impact that ideas have on her life. 
 
Glyn(BH):… every second, everything is filtered through what I now 
see as a charade, I basically see, it‘s difficult to explain, have you ever 
seen The Matrix <Louise: mmm> you know when he starts seeing 
everything as code <Louise: yeah> you see it in a different way, I can 
see things in a different way (Glyn and John; 522-527) 
 
Drawing on an analogy to ‗The Matrix‟, Glyn described how endorsement of 
conspiracies enabled him to develop a unique perspective or insight into the 
world that is with him ―every second‖ of the day. 
 
Achieving a sense of balance between the importance of claims and the 
importance of not allowing claims to dominate seems integral to many participant 
accounts. Alice articulated this balance through the acknowledgement that it is 
likely claims may not be correct: 
 
Alice(FFMP):… So um, you have to uh, I think you just have to be 
really calm about it and realise that you‘re never going to understand 
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everything <Louise: mmm> and you‘re probably going to get most of it 
wrong (Liam and Alice; 1243-1246) 
 
Alice expressed a wish for certainty or closure regarding claims yet 
simultaneously described being aware that she would probably never know 
all of the answers.  
 
Tom(BH):…Um, but I didn‘t sort of throw myself into it and think that 
everything they say is, I didn‘t go from like one world view to an 
<Louise: yeah> complete other extreme straight away <Olga: not at all, 
not at all> in fact I still don‘t <Louise: mmm> you know, one thing that 
it‘s taught me is to always ask questions (Tom and Olga; 139-143) 
 
Tom described focusing on asking questions rather than drawing firm 
conclusions. Whilst participants‘ worldviews enabled them to develop a unique 
perspective on the world, it appears that decentralising the importance of claims 
was a helpful strategy employed by participants to moderate the effect of ideas 
on their lives. Perhaps facilitated through the integration of experiences and 
minority reality claims into selfhood, participants described balancing the 
centrality and importance of claims within their lives whilst maintaining some 
distance from ideas. Thus, whilst claims were omnipresent throughout life, there 
was a sense that preserving a ‗normal‘ life was also important. 
 
Category 2: Experiencing and negotiating claims with others 
This category explores the experience and negotiation of claims within 
interpersonal contexts. Participants described being confronted by an initial 
dilemma regarding a desire to share claims yet fearing social exclusion. It seems 
that this experience is managed through ‗testing claims with others‘ leading to 
‗developing strategies to share claims‘. ‗Testing claims with others‘, involved 
sharing ideas in diverse social contexts, often with people previously unknown or 
distant from participants. Participants described experiencing a broad range of 
reactions from other people, many of which were negative and hostile. 
Participants also frequently described sharing claims and ‗experiencing 
scepticism and acceptance from close others‘. Experiences of scepticism and 
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acceptance enabled participants to develop strategies to share claims outside of 
immediate family and peer groups. For some participants, the primary strategy 
developed regarding claims was ‗deciding not to share‘ in most contexts. Finally, 
participants talked about ‗seeking and meeting likeminded others‘ which 
enhanced their interpersonal experiences of claims. All subcategories are 
elaborated below.  
 
Desire to share vs. desire for inclusion 
Participants described a dilemma concerning a desire to share claims with others 
yet simultaneously fearing exclusion as a result of sharing ideas. Descriptions 
focused largely on predicted reactions of others rather than direct experiences of 
exclusion. Many participants talked about initially not telling others about claims. 
 
Paul(BH): well I lived, I lived with it for a lot of years, I mean I never 
really talked about it to anybody <Louise: mmm> right up until, well, a 
few people, me brother knew and all that uh, but I never really, really 
talked about it <Louise: mmm> ‗cus people would think I was mad 
(Paul and Jane; 1591-1595) 
 
Paul described not talking about claims based on a fear that others would judge 
claims as mad. Paul highlighted the role of close others (friends, partners or 
family members) as an initial forum to ‗test claims‘. 
 
Tom(BH): I said, ―I can‘t really tell you,‖ because I wasn‘t ready to talk 
about it <Louise: yeah> um, and he said, ―well if you, if you do then my 
door‘s always open‖ (Tom and Olga; 358-360) 
 
Tom described not being ―ready to talk‖. Both Paul and Tom‘s accounts are 
echoed in other participant descriptions about initially being reluctant to share 
ideas with others. Both descriptions seem to point to the dilemma about talking 
occurring at an early stage of the development of claims and an initial reticence 
to share ideas. The resolution of this dilemma, discussed later, often involved 
carefully selecting a person to share ideas with. However, as described below, 
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initial attempts to share ideas can reinforce the concerns central in the dilemma 
about claims. 
 
Predicting others‟ reactions 
Central to many participant accounts was a sense that others might respond 
negatively to claims.  
 
Jack(BH): well, first of all I decided not to tell everybody 
Louise: right, why did you decide not to tell everybody? 
Jack: because I‘d seen the reaction to other people who‘d said that 
they‘d seen aliens and things… (Megan and Jack; 947-950) 
 
Jack initially decided not to tell people based on previous experiences of others 
sharing unusual ideas. In this extract, Jack depersonalises the negative reaction 
predicted by others. Later he described how as a child he had seen a UFO and 
been ridiculed when he told his family. This negative experience then served as a 
template for others‘ reactions, leading Jack initially to conceal his ideas. 
 
Louise: what stopped you from, because you said there was a part of 
you that felt like people need to know <Tom: yeah> what stopped you 
from letting people know? 
Tom(BH): um, fear of ridicule <Louise: right> and them thinking I‘m 
crazy (Tom and Olga; 342-346) 
 
Tom similarly appeared to initially decide not to tell people, fearing exclusion 
through ridicule and being labelled as mad. Since almost all participants 
subsequently described experiences of sharing claims with others, it appears that 
the dilemma regarding sharing ideas and fearing exclusion is experienced at 
early stages of the formation of minority reality claims. Initial experiences of 
sharing claims are important and, if negative, act as a deterrent for further 
disclosure. Perhaps this dilemma echoes participants‘ own sense of claims - that 
they are important and personally compelling yet may be seen as signs of 
madness. Thus, the acceptance of others is vital in to the accommodation of 
claims within participants‘ lives.  
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“Conspiracy Tourette‟s” 
Many participants described experiencing a sense of urgency or need to tell 
people about claims. This sense of urgency often arose due to the nature of 
claims (widespread conspiracy and lies against the population at large), but also 
may reflect a sense of fear that fantastical ideas might be just that. Therefore, 
sharing claims with others and seeking social validation was sometimes 
experienced as if a compulsion to tell others. 
 
Alice(FFMP): …because you can, you can come across an idea and 
you can think ―oh my God, that‘s absolutely amazing‖ and your initial 
reaction is to run out and tell everybody (Liam and Alice; 1238-1241) 
 
Alice described the experience of discovering new ideas as being characterised 
by amazement and an initial urge to tell others. Implicit within her description is 
that the initial compulsion to tell others is not advisable. She later elaborated this, 
stating that it is important to ―let things settle for a long time‖. 
 
Glyn(BH): …it just comes out, it‘s like Tourette‘s! (laughter) <Louise: 
yeah> it is, it‘s like, uh, conspiracy Tourette‘s <Louise: mmm> I can‘t 
stop it, I just feel if there‘s a context in which there‘s an issue being 
raised <Louise: mmm> I have to, it just comes up (Glyn and Aaron; 
826-830) 
 
Glyn joked about his desire to tell others being uncontrollable, likening it to 
Tourette‘s. His analogy to Tourette‘s powerfully evokes the sense that however 
ill-advised, at times, his desire to tell others becomes uncontrollable. It seems 
that, for Glyn and some other participants, the primary motivation to share claims 
is making others aware of the conspiracies around them. On other occasions and 
for other participants, a desire for social validation drives their motivation to share 
claims.  
 
Testing claims with others 
The subcategory ‗testing claims with others‘ concerns the process of exploring 
claims with others and their reactions. Through the experience of adverse 
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reactions, participants described developing sensitivity to, and understanding of, 
the social processes contributing to others‘ responses to claims.  
 
Encountering negative reactions 
Descriptions of encountering negative reactions to claims were prevalent 
throughout most accounts. Most commonly, negative reactions included hostility 
and occasionally aggression. Negative reactions come from both close others as 
well as through encounters with more socially distant individuals. It seems 
however, that the most aversive reactions were experienced in broader social 
settings rather than with friends or family members.  
 
Liam(BH): …I mean, uh, a lot of people just get really, aggressively run 
you down if they know you have a non-conformist view (Liam and 
Alice; 333-335) 
 
Liam linked non-conformist views with the experience of aggression in others. 
This indicates that endorsing claims that are not widely shared involves 
managing a degree of hostility and aggression in others.  
 
Alice(FFMP): …I think people are frightened of the unknown, I think 
they formulate a plan of what‘s going on and if anything threatens that 
plan <Louise: mmm> they get very, very fearful and very angry and 
very defensive…they don‘t really want you to disturb it <Louise: yeah> 
um, and any kind of attempt to disturb that, you, you get this incredible 
resistance… (Liam and Alice; 413-422) 
 
Alice interpreted the response of others as stemming from a fear of the unknown. 
According to this view, in sharing minority reality claims, participants risk 
disturbing people‘s sense of the world and evoking fearful and defensive 
responses.  
 
Paul(BH): …you know this [taps three times on the table], this is the 
way it is and anything…outside that is, is lunacy or low intelligence 
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thinking <Louise: mmm> and that‘s what they‘re taught (Paul and 
Jane; 1733-1736) 
 
Paul similarly accounted for the reaction of others being due to a rigid approach 
to ideas outside the norm. Throughout most interviews, participants described 
negative, hostile responses to claims but simultaneously attempted to explain 
why others reacted in this way.  Understanding others‘ reactions may be a helpful 
strategy for participants when faced with negative responses as it enables them 
to intellectualise their responses. Through intellectualising scepticism, 
participants were able to reconstruct reactions as ignorance, reinforcing 
conspiratorial ideas that the truth is withheld from the masses and the supremacy 
of their knowledge.  
 
Being dismissed and experiencing exclusion 
Participants described being dismissed and excluded as a result of sharing 
claims with some people.  
 
Alice(FFMP): …they have this, um, hostility about it, they just reject 
you as a person <Louise: right> so you just become a blank space, 
they won‘t listen to anything you say, they won‘t discuss anything with 
you, they don‘t really want to be your friend…(Liam and Alice; 485-
488) 
 
Alice summarised both the experience of being dismissed as a person and 
experiencing tangible consequences such as others not wishing to be her 
friend. Her articulation of this seems to echo a sense of persecution from an 
oppressive other –‖they‖. Alice‘s description implies that the expression of 
claims can lead to both her ideas and personhood being invalidated. This 
account illustrates the powerful negative reactions that people face when 
expressing minority reality claims.  
 
Jane(FFMP): but they don‘t want to think about it so as soon as you 
say anything they just label you as a conspiracy theorist which is…a 
catchall phrase to dismiss anything (Paul and Jane; 1002-1004) 
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Jane suggested that others‘ dislike for ideas that challenge leads to a propensity 
to quickly label claims as conspiracies, therefore undermining their legitimacy and 
justifying their dismissal. 
 
Adam (BH): society‘s been programmed to look at it as a joke or you 
know, dismiss it, it‘s, it‘s…like control <Louise: mmm> mind control 
almost (Adam and Sarah; 783-785) 
 
Adam pointed to social processes through which conspiracies are ridiculed and 
dismissed. His description of programming and ―mind control‖ implies a 
conscious effort to discredit conspiracies through dismissing ideas as impossible 
without the need to take any aspect of claims seriously. By implication, taking 
claims seriously might expose people to ridicule and being dismissed, thus 
reinforcing dismissive responses to claims. 
 
Matteo(FFMP): …basically it‘s just the loneliness you perceive in, in 
trying to conversate with the person, I‘ve had that many times, like 
trying to conversate with a person and just not getting anywhere 
(Roshan and Matteo; 803-807) 
 
Matteo described experiencing loneliness and isolation in the context of 
attempting to share minority reality claims. His description alludes to a barrier in 
understanding ideas, with the other person unable to access the claims. 
 
Peter(BH): a lot of people, when you say the word aliens to them and 
you get a hand in the face <Louise: mmm> they go, oh, I don‘t want 
know, whatever it is that you‘re gonna say is nothing to do with reality 
(Peter and Sue; 330-333) 
 
At the mention of the word ‗alien‘, Peter similarly explained that many people 
immediately dismiss claims without further evaluation. This resonates with 
previous ideas expressed by Jane and Adam regarding the immediacy of others‘ 
responses and lack of consideration of ideas. 
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Glyn(BH): …they walk away and you know, kind of, don‘t bother me, 
like a madman, like, like the crazy man on the train (Glyn and John; 
374-376) 
 
Finally, Glyn likened others‘ responses to the denigration and exclusion 
often associated with the treatment of mental health service users. Overall, 
it appears that participants‘ experiences of sharing minority reality claims is 
often extremely negative leading to exclusion and rejection of ideas and the 
participants themselves. 
 
Testing claims with others 
This subcategory explores the process described by participants regarding who 
to talk to about claims, how claims are shared and validated and how participants 
resist negative responses in others. This subtheme also explores how 
participants understand others‘ rejection of claims. 
 
“They don‟t want to know anything”: Explaining mainstream conformity 
Participants appeared to account for their minority reality claims through 
explaining how others maintain dominant worldviews by rejecting or ignoring 
―awakening points‖: 
 
Jack(BH):… from my personal point of view, everyone I know has a, 
an awakening point <Louise: mmm> you have a spiritual experience, 
most people don‘t do anything about it (Megan and Jack; 465-468) 
 
Jack proposed that although ―awakening points‖ are common experiences, most 
people ignore them. 
 
Sarah(FFMP): and they‘ve been trained by the media and 
propaganda…to not believe (Adam and Sarah; 770-771) 
 
Sarah highlighted the role of the media in quelling people‘s propensity to endorse 
unusual beliefs, implying that people are socialised to believe a certain reality 
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rather than making a conscious choice.  Perhaps by explaining how the majority 
of people maintain mainstream views, participants were more tolerant of, and 
able to respond to scepticism, negativity and exclusion.  
 
Jack(BH): …you see a lot of people are frightened of being ostracised 
<Louise: yeah> of being kicked out of society…and this is where the 
people who control us have their power (Megan and Jack; 469-372) 
 
Jack integrated his understanding of why others reject minority reality claims with 
his belief that powerful institutions create a context whereby people fear non-
conformity as a way of controlling and manipulating ‗the masses‘. The 
incorporation of the idea that most people do not endorse claims into participants‘ 
overall conspiracy theories was common. Indeed, mainstream conformity is the 
very thing that participants are rebelling against. It is possible that 
accommodating others‘ aversive reactions into claims is one strategy employed 
by participants to manage the experience of endorsing minority reality claims. 
 
Validating claims interpersonally 
Participants described the strategies they employed to validate claims when 
faced with scepticism and appeared to employ such techniques throughout the 
interviews perhaps in an attempt to persuade me of the validity of their claims. 
Interpersonal strategies for validating claims seemed contingent on two inter-
linked processes: citing scientific, technical evidence and persuading the listener 
of the eventual inevitability of sharing participants‘ conclusions.  
 
Peter(BH): if I didn‘t have the science…to back up what I was saying, I 
probably would be saying, I‘d be a jabbering guy in the corner, 
wouldn‘t I, you‘d be locking me in those coats with long arms! But um, 
because I‘ve got the science <Louise: mmm> I feel more able to 
say…yeah this is what‘s happening, this is what‘s going on because of 
these reasons. (Peter and Sue; 490-496) 
 
Peter‘s description counter-posed science and madness, stating that without the 
authority of science supporting his claims, they would be reducible to madness. 
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Adam(BH): I think that the average intelligent person, if they delved 
into it and actually were aware of the evidence, they wouldn‘t deny it 
(Adam and Sarah; 766-767) 
 
Adam drew on another strategy, prevalent within many participant accounts, of 
pointing to evidence others may not have accessed. Adam‘s suggestion that a 
person of average intelligence with access to certain information would inevitably 
draw the same conclusion primes the listener to agree. Disagreement risks being 
seen as unintelligent either through lack of knowledge or faulty reasoning.  
 
Paul (BH): …it‘s like, uh, continental drift, um, was ridiculed…Alfred 
Wegener [first proposed continental drift theory]…he was thought of as 
an absolute crackpot and an idiot <Louise: mmm> by the scientific 
community for 50 years then in the 50s, some scientists said ―oh, 
maybe it, it‘s continental drift‖ (Paul and Jane; 374-370) 
 
Paul made reference to historical antecedents to support his argument; 
highlighting  the changing nature of scientific understandings. This strategy, 
present in many participant accounts, serves to support claims through the 
suggestion that the nature of knowledge is in constant flux. Thus, whilst ideas 
might seem implausible now, this can quickly change.  
 
All participants appeared to draw on scientific discourses to validate their claims. 
Many participants used technical language; perhaps to convince me that a wealth 
of information exists of which I was unaware. Most participants commented on 
the way in which knowledge and science evolves over time, supporting both the 
idea that new discoveries are imminent and that with time and access to the 
correct information, others would draw similar conclusions. These strategies 
seem to be helpful when trying to convince a listener of the plausibility of claims.  
 
Getting “a feel for someone‟s inclination” 
Participants reported experiencing frustration that others were unable to access 
or unwilling to listen to ideas.  
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Tom(BH): …but then I realised, after banging my head against a brick 
wall with a lot of people, that you‘ve just got to have acceptance, that 
some people are never, ever going to change (Tom and Olga; 911-
914) 
 
Tom described feeling as though he was banging his head against a brick wall 
when talking to others and eventually accepting that some people will not 
change. There appeared to be an experiential dimension to this process, 
experiencing frustration but slowly learning over time that there will always be 
people who resist claims. 
 
Liam(BH): I think you, we, um, a baby step and sort of ask <Louise: 
mhmm> get a feel for someone‘s inclination… (Liam and Alice; 307-
308) 
 
Perhaps in response to experiencing frustration when sharing claims, Liam 
described learning to be sensitive to others‘ responses. He adopted a cautious 
approach, sharing a small piece of information to gain an understanding of a 
person‘s inclination towards claims. Through carefully testing claims, it appeared 
that participants were able to develop implicit criteria for deciding who to talk to. 
This seems like a helpful strategy to avoid feelings of frustration when talking 
about ideas. 
 
Jane(FFMP): I mean you can‘t, I don‘t think you can be very sensitive 
in terms I mean, of criticism and things like that (Paul and Jane; 
1377—1378) 
 
Jane described the importance of not being sensitive, alluding to previously 
experiencing criticism in the context of sharing claims. This appears to be another 
potentially useful strategy employed by participants. Given the negative and 
hostile responses participants described experiencing; it seems that not taking 
others‘ responses personally may protect participants from feeling dejected after 
sharing claims.  
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Ensuring worldview does not dominate  
A further strategy described by participants was ensuring that their claims did not 
dominate all their interactions. Adam described a nonchalant approach to people 
who are uninterested or do not go into ideas in ―any depth‖: 
 
Adam(BH): …he [a friend] doesn‘t go into it [discussions about aliens] 
in any depth so I just leave it, you know <Louise: mmm, mmm> if 
people aren‘t interested, it‘s up to them isn‘t it (Adam and Sarah; 648-
650) 
 
Paul: um (2) if it [conspiracies] comes up, I mean I don‘t go out of my 
way to talk about it with everyone I meet <Louise: mmm> in every 
situation <Louise: yeah> but if the situation comes up, then I talk about 
it (Paul and Jane; 550-553) 
 
Similarly to Adam, Paul demonstrated sensitivity to context and not talking about 
his ideas with everyone he meets. Ensuring that the worldview does not dominate 
seemed central to many participants. Indeed, both Jane and Liam explicitly 
differentiate themselves from ―evangelical conspiracy theorists‖, criticising people 
who allow their views to totally dominate their interactions: 
 
Jane(FFMP):…I take issue with the kind of, evangelical push that 
some conspiracy theories have …it reminds me so much…they are 
fundamentalists and they don‘t see it because …they‘re under this 
cloak of (laughs) there being an alternative conspiracy (Paul and Jane; 
1231-1238)  
 
Negotiating the balance between the importance of claims and ensuring views 
did not dominate was difficult for some participants. Aaron reflected on Glyn‘s 
interactions, stating that his minority reality claims did not dominate: 
 
Aaron(FFMP): …I don‘t think that it‘s something that‘s characterised 
your interaction with my friends, I think they remember you for lots of 
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other things than that, I don‘t see my dad as just the guy that goes on 
about conspiracy theories (Glyn and Aaron; 727-730) 
 
Glyn previously talked about becoming overwhelmed by his ideas leading him to 
feel compelled to tell others. It seems that although he may experience moments 
where his ideas become overwhelming, he is mostly able to manage these 
experiences, ensuring that the majority of his interactions are not dominated by 
claims. 
 
Other participants described how beliefs permeated interactions, leading them to 
look for ways to provide information in the context of everyday conversations: 
 
Megan: …I‘m looking for windows all the while to try and jump in to 
give them a seed, a seed <Louise: mmm> of uh, information… (Megan 
and Jack; 1070-1071) 
 
Megan‘s idea of ―looking for windows‖ is echoed in many accounts. The analogy 
of ―planting seeds‖ was also commonly used by participants regarding their 
approach to disseminating information. Participants acknowledged the need to 
ensure that claims did not dominate all interactions, however appeared to have 
developed strategies to maximise opportunities to share ideas through a careful 
and sensitive approach to integrating claims within everyday conversations. 
 
Deciding not to share 
Whilst all participants talked about not sharing claims in certain contexts, some 
participants talked about almost never disclosing ideas to others. Perhaps 
somewhat unsurprisingly, those who said they never talked about claims were 
exclusively the FFMP participants. Whilst this may reflect a lower level of ‗belief 
conviction‘ (observed in PDI scores), the participants constructed the decision not 
to share ideas as being related to a variety of social processes. Three female 
participants said that they never talk to others about their ideas. 
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Alice(FFMP): I just don‘t talk about it ever. I‘ve just got that policy with 
almost everybody <Louise: yeah> it‘s easier if you, if you don‘t talk 
about it (Liam and Alice; 502-504) 
 
Sue(FFMP): no it‘s, I don‘t speak to anyone about it really, because 
maybe I don‘t have the understanding, I would feel self-conscious 
doing it because I don‘t have the understanding (Peter and Sue; 587-
589) 
 
Both Alice and Sue stated that they do not talk about ideas with other people. 
Sue justifies this as being due to her lack of knowledge which would lead her to 
feel self-conscious. During the interview, Sue stated that she did not share 
Peter‘s ideas although was interested in them. In contrast, Alice shared many of 
Liam‘s minority reality claims and had several ideas of her own regarding 
conspiracies. A third participant, Jane, similarly endorsed many minority reality 
claims yet stated that she did not routinely share her ideas.  
 
Alice(FFMP):… guys kind of usually Liam‘s age and background, um, 
kind of lump it together with the, with the stupid feminine thing: you‘re 
a girl so you must be a bit thick and you‘re into all this tarot and stuff 
so you must be a bit of a ninny <Louise: mmm> and, you know, it 
really does change people‘s reaction to you <Louise: yeah, yeah> 
(Liam and Alice; 455-460) 
 
Alice highlighted the gender context of sharing claims and how sexism may 
provide a further deterrent for women to share their ideas. This raises interesting 
questions about what it might be like to hold and share claims as a woman. Given 
the propensity for others to dismiss claims without investigation, it is possible that 
women are further disadvantaged when sharing claims. Exploration of the 
narratives of women with minority reality claims would be an interesting area for 
further research.  
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Experiencing scepticism and acceptance from close others 
Participants described encountering scepticism and acceptance from people 
close to them. FFMP participants highlighted the importance of having respect for 
others‘ ideas, even if they did not share them. 
 
Jane(FFMP): no I mean we don‘t, we have enough respect for each 
other that you know, I‘d never dismiss anything Paul says (Paul and 
Jane; 951-952) 
 
Jane previously stated that there were things she and Paul disagreed about but 
emphasised that this disagreement was not about dismissing ideas. Here she 
seems to differentiate her response of scepticism from the negative responses 
previously described. 
 
Sue(FFMP): …I respect the fact that everyone‘s got different theories, 
different outlooks on things, different takes on life <Louise: mmm> and 
I‘m quite fascinated to hear <Louise: mmm> the views and opinions 
and things that people think are gonna happen… some people might 
think, ―oh aliens, whatever‖ but no, if that‘s what he believes…but …for 
me …there is a part of me that doesn‘t want to believe it [world will end 
in December 2012], not because I don‘t think it is real but because 
obviously I want to plan my life and…it‘s quite scary (Peter and Sue; 
379-390) 
 
Perhaps having respect for ideas is important when expressing disagreement in 
order to ensure that the speaker does not feel dismissed. Sue carefully balances 
her uncertainty about Peter‘s ideas by separating herself from dismissive others. 
She states an interest in different perspectives yet says she does not share 
beliefs due to fear rather than because she thinks the ideas are false. This 
account is interesting as Sue demonstrated some scepticism about ideas yet 
bases this on a desire for future life rather than logic and science.  
 
Olga(FFMP): …I mean my, my family <Louise: right> they don‘t, they 
aren‘t, I always thought they were really open minded but they‘re not 
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actually that open minded and they just, yeah, they, they think it‘s a, a 
horrible worldview <Louise: right> that you can‘t think like that, you 
can‘t live like that (Tom and Olga; 951-955) 
 
Olga expressed surprise that her ―open-minded‖ family do not share her ideas. 
She links their dismissal of her claims to their experience of the worldview as 
―horrible‖. This suggests an emotional rather than logical rejection of ideas. In 
addition, their objection was that Olga ―can‘t live like that‖ pointing again to an 
emotional response to her claims. The simultaneous scepticism about, yet 
acceptance of, claims from people close to participants is interesting and perhaps 
enables participants to develop strategies to share claims within a safe context of 
respect.  
 
Seeking and meeting likeminded others 
Participants described seeking and meeting likeminded others to share ideas and 
disseminate information with. Both internet and face-to-face opportunities were 
sought by participants to share claims. Participants described valuing 
opportunities to meet likeminded others as it enabled them to be open and free in 
their ideas, abandoning many of the cautious strategies adopted in day-to-day 
life. 
 
Tom(BH): oh yeah it would, it would, yeah. You know, if you were like 
virtually the only ones, it would be more difficult <Louise: mmm> yeah 
um and it, and it‘s refreshing to know that there are a lot of other… you 
realise there are so many people, not just in this country but across the 
world who feel the same way (Tom and Olga; 1206-1211) 
 
Tom described how difficult it would be to be isolated in his claims and the 
importance of knowing that across the world other people share his ideas.  
 
Paul(BH): …and then I started finding out that it was obviously 
personal to a lot of other people and then obviously once the world 
wide web come along, you found out it‘s personal to millions of people 
all round the world (Paul and Jane; 98-101) 
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Talking about his experiences of telepathic alien communication, Paul highlighted 
the role of the internet in connecting him with ―millions of people‖ who share his 
ability. Many participants found refuge in the ability to share ideas online and 
interact with people across the world that share similar views.  
 
Tom(BH): you know, it, it is nice where you can just talk freely and 
openly about anything really <Louise: mmm> and not be judged 
Olga(FFMP): and also what‘s nice is that it didn‘t have, the group that 
we were involved in, it was just a social meet up with likeminded 
people (Tom and Olga; 674-678) 
 
Tom and Olga discussed enjoying the social aspect of groups in which they feel 
able to talk openly and freely without judgement. Olga later stated that knowing 
there is a community of people with similar ideas protects her from feeling 
demoralised when faced with scepticism and negativity about ideas.  
 
Liam(BH): yeah, I think that, I‘m a, a [involved in] an organisation…that 
discusses these kinds of things, so, it‘s nice to have an opportunity 
and, and people come together who have these ideas because 
sometimes it‘s unsociable to discuss them in general context (Liam 
and Alice; 269-273) 
 
Liam‘s involvement in an organisation open to his claims provided a positive 
opportunity for him to discuss ideas considered ―unsociable‖ in other contexts. 
Thus, it appears that seeking out likeminded individuals and groups both in 
person and online, is important to participants. Drawing support from likeminded 
others and having an opportunity to talk in the context of a receptive audience 
may help participants successfully negotiate their claims within other contexts. It 
seems that having a forum in which ideas can be shared and accepted is vitally 
important as it enabled them to receive validation of claims and better manage 
scepticism and hostility in social contexts with ‗non-believers‘. 
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The intra- and inter-personal experience and negotiation of minority reality 
claims: A grounded theory 
The two core categories ‗discovering and managing a new world‘ and 
‗experiencing and negotiating claims with others‘ are complementary with many 
processes running in parallel between the two. Thus, the linear presentation of 
the model here is simplified and developed as a prototype of how claims may be 
developed and negotiated. There were variations across participants and 
contexts, perhaps indicative of the dynamic nature of belief construction and 
negotiation. Relationships between categories are represented by arrows on the 
model. 
 
Participants described initial processes surrounding claims taking place intra-
individually. Both the realisation that ‗the world is not what it seems‘ and the 
dilemma surrounding the ‗desire to share vs. desire for inclusion‘ were 
characterised by participants as largely unarticulated processes, not shared in 
social contexts. The realisation that the world was not what it had previously 
seemed led participants to question and search for the truth. They described how 
this questioning and searching process was linked to the dilemma about whether 
or not to share claims socially. Over time and through experiencing inter-personal 
negotiation of claims, participants‘ intra- and inter-personal management of 
claims became more explicit and easily shared within social contexts.  
 
Participants described a parallel process of managing the ‗emotional impact of 
claims‘ intra-individually and gradually ‗testing claims with others‘ in a variety of 
contexts with both socially distant and close others. For some participants, the 
emotionally overwhelming experience of claims occasionally led to sharing ideas 
in risky situations (e.g. Glyn and Olga reported proselytising on trains), leading to 
negative reactions from others. For other participants, experiencing acceptance 
from people close to them was an emotionally positive experience, enhancing 
their ability to test claims in broader social contexts. Participants described how 
managing the emotional impact of claims and testing claims in a variety of social 
contexts led to a greater integration of claims into their sense of themselves 
(‗storying claims and integrating selfhood‘). This integrated narrative between self 
and claims had an impact on the ‗development of strategies to share claims‘, with 
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participants noticing that clearer, more integrated narratives were greeted with 
less scepticism and greater acceptance. 
 
Through experiencing a variety of different reactions to claims, participants were 
able to develop strategies to more effectively share claims in social contexts and 
become aware of situations in which sharing claims was not advisable. For some 
FFMP participants, the primary strategy employed was to not share claims in 
most social contexts. It is unclear if this was due to less investment in ideas and 
therefore motivation to share, if this was simply a strategy adopted by some 
individuals or if this was reflective of less experience of negotiating claims which 
might change over time. Indeed, many belief holder participants described initially 
not sharing claims but this changing over time. This may be an interesting area 
for further research.  
 
The scepticism and acceptance of close others led to a variety of responses from 
participants including initially not sharing claims as well as facilitating the 
development of strategies to share claims. It appears that the reaction of FFMP 
sometimes enabled participants to test out claims before sharing ideas in wider 
social contexts. This process links to the second research question regarding 
FFMP understandings of, and narratives about, minority reality claims. It seems 
that all these participants were open to and accepting of claims, regardless of 
whether or not they shared them. Close others may act as an interface with wider 
society, providing claim endorsers with a space to explore claims without the risk 
of social exclusion or judgement.  
 
The first research question focused on the intra- and inter-personal negotiation of 
claims. Participants described the development of ideas and the importance of 
integrating new knowledge into their sense of self. This integration between 
claims and self was described by participants as having a reciprocal impact on 
intra- and inter-personal processes. By developing a coherent narrative, 
participants reported feeling more able to present claims in a manner that was 
convincing to others. In addition, it appeared that participants felt that the 
integration of claims into their sense of self was important.  
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The third research question concerned the management of distress and conflict 
associated with claims. Participants described a variety of emotional experiences 
arising from the development of claims including feelings of sadness and 
frustration but also how personally compelling and exciting claims were. The 
integration of claims into participants‘ narratives seemed an important process for 
them to manage the distress associated with claims. Sharing claims socially 
sometimes added to the sense of frustration and isolation associated with beliefs 
but could also serve to reinforce the developing narrative of the truth being 
withheld from the population at large. Seeking and meeting likeminded others 
provided participants with a supportive forum in which ideas could be shared. 
Further, through experience of negotiating claims interpersonally, participants 
became versed in strategies to share claims within different contexts. Through 
experience over time, participants reported more positive interpersonal 
experiences of sharing claims which impacted on their emotional wellbeing.  
 
The research questions will be further elaborated and explored in light of the 
results and previous literature in the discussion chapter.  
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Figure 3: A model of how participants manage minority reality claims intra- and inter-personally 
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DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter focuses on discussion of the analysis in the context of the research 
questions and previous literature. The quality of the research will be evaluated 
and limitations described. Finally, research and clinical implications will be 
explored.  
 
Research questions 
 
How do individuals within the general population who endorse minority reality 
claims manage their beliefs on an intra- and inter-personal level? 
Processes underpinning the intra- and inter-personal negotiation of claims are 
often similar or complementary. For example, the emotional impact of new 
knowledge was an intra-individual process that was reciprocally related to testing 
ideas socially. Participants sometimes described how distress associated with 
claims gave rise to testing ideas socially whilst at other times, positive 
experiences of testing claims socially impacted on participants‘ emotional states. 
Storying claims both personally and interpersonally appeared central to the 
negotiation of claims through increasing participants‘ confidence to share claims 
in various contexts.  
 
Taylor and Murray (2012) interviewed individuals who reported experiencing 
clairaudience (hearing the voice of a dead person). In their research, participants 
described the importance of developing a coherent overarching understanding of 
their experiences (Taylor & Murray, 2012). Taylor and Murray‘s (2012) research 
highlighted the importance of developing an explanation of experiences before 
they could be accommodated into daily life. Similarly, Heriot-Maitland, Knight and 
Peters (2011) interviewed clinical and non-clinical individuals about ‗out of the 
ordinary experiences‘ such as hearing voices. The authors suggested that 
distress appeared to be associated with a failure to integrate unusual 
experiences into interpersonal and background personal contexts. Taken 
together, it appears that the integration of claims into selfhood may serve several 
important functions.  
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As discussed previously, some participants described traumatic experiences 
precipitating belief formation. Heriot-Maitland et al. (2011) found that existential 
questioning and emotional suffering was a precipitant to many participants‘ 
unusual experiences. In the context of religious conversion, Shaw, Joseph and 
Linley (2005) suggested that following trauma, people may rebuild their lives, 
creating meaning from events and enhancing existential awareness. The authors 
argued that traumatic experiences lead to reappraisals of threat, revealing 
positive personal outcomes and augmenting spiritual and religious life (Shaw et 
al., 2005). Such ideas may be applied to the experiences described by some 
participants that led to their ‗shattered worlds‘ (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) (e.g. 
Megan‘s daughter‘s suicide) and subsequent reappraisal of the world and 
themselves.  
 
Gergen (1994) suggested that self-narratives are conversational devices that 
create links among self-relevant life experiences. Rather than reifying notions of 
identity, Gergen (1994) argued that self-narratives serve social functions and may 
be considered to result from people‘s attempts to interact through discourse. This 
approach acknowledges the multiplicity of narrative environments and the impact 
of context on constructions and resonates with participant accounts. Narratives 
about claims appeared to be co-created socially with decisions regarding what 
information to share being contingent on the social context. 
 
Participants described diverse ways of legitimising claims, drawing on science 
and logic as well as intuition to validate claims. This construction of claims, based 
on a variety of scientific and intuitive methods, may reflect the way in which 
participants narrate claims in diverse contexts. The personally compelling nature 
of claims provided participants with an intrinsic sense of the veracity of claims 
e.g. Jane described not needing others to validate claims. In social contexts 
however, it appeared that participants drew on discourses of science and logic to 
validate claims. It seems that a critical realist social constructionist epistemology 
fits with this dynamic approach to claim negotiation through recognising the 
varying contexts in which claims are constructed.  
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Participants generally described a cautious approach to the interpersonal 
negotiation of claims. This involved resisting occasional urges to proselytise 
(further discussed in question 3), an acute sensitivity and awareness of the 
reactions of others as well as developing strategies to validate claims 
interpersonally. Participants‘ social insight together with their strategies for 
validating ideas seemed to enhance their ability to negotiate claims 
interpersonally. Gergen (1999) discussed how incompatible ontologies can lead 
to communication difficulties. Drawing on discourses of science and logic, 
participants may counteract potential breakdowns in communication arising from 
divergent ontological frameworks (Heise, 1988). In addition, by maintaining social 
commitment through the use of scientific paradigms, participants were perhaps 
more able to preserve social power. Since Heise (1988) suggested that power 
rather than falsity is integral to madness labels, participants‘ abilities to maintain 
power interpersonally seemed an important strategy to prevent labelling and 
exclusion. 
 
Some participants addressed the potential labelling of madness through explicitly 
rejecting labels such as ‗paranoid‘ or ‗schizophrenic‘. Acknowledgment that ideas 
may be seen as a sign of madness, rejection of this identity and separation of 
emotionality from claims may be effective strategies for validating beliefs 
interpersonally. Thus, although participants described claims being personally 
compelling and drawing on intuition to validate claims personally, the 
interpersonal negotiation of claims involved instead highlighting the importance of 
scientific evidence to validate claims. Oliver (1991) argued that the power 
afforded to rationality within Western cultures leads people to feel compelled to 
demonstrate logical, rational thinking in order for their ideas to be considered 
valid. Rationality is conceptualised as being divorced from emotional attachments 
(Oliver, 1991). Participants‘ rejection of madness and emotionality discursively 
positioned them as logical, rational thinkers therefore legitimising the validity of 
claims. Gergaca (2004) argued that individuals diagnosed with delusions cited 
evidence in their explanation of claims but this evidence was not persuasive to 
others. For participants in this research, it appears that sensitivity to how 
persuasive evidence was for others was an important aspect of how successfully 
they felt that they negotiated claims.  
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How do friends, family members or partners of individuals who endorse minority 
reality claims understand and experience the claims? 
It is important to initially contextualise the present sample. Over 25 people 
contacted me via email regarding the research but subsequently declined 
participation, largely due to the criterion of being interviewed with someone who 
knew about their beliefs. Whilst it is only possible to speculate, it may be that the 
present sample is unusual due to participants‘ willingness to share ideas and 
ability to find a FFMP to be interviewed with. Thus, this sample may only 
represent a certain portion of unusual belief holders within the non-clinical 
population.  
 
FFMP participants reported largely sharing belief holder‘s minority reality claims, 
although often in an attenuated form. However, due to the conjoint nature of 
interviews, the extent to which FFMP participants would endorse claims alone or 
in other contexts remains unclear. Conversely, perhaps this provides an insight 
the dynamic nature of claim endorsement and how expressions of claims may be 
contingent on the social context.   
 
FFMP participants described an interest and acceptance of ideas even when they 
reported not personally endorsing claims. A tolerant approach was generally 
described by belief holders regarding others close to them such as family 
members and close friends. Heriot-Maitland et al. (2011) argued that compared 
to clinical participants, non-clinical participants were more able to incorporate 
unusual experiences into their social worlds. The authors suggested that this was 
largely due to experiences of validation and acceptance from others (Heriot-
Maitland et al., 2011). The present findings support this research and add the 
perspective of FFMP participants.  
 
Participants described varying levels of acceptance and openness to ideas within 
multiple contexts of their lives. Thus, claims were constructed, negotiated and 
legitimised within diverse social contexts. Participants linked the accepting, open 
attitude of close others to the development of strategies to more effectively share 
claims in wider social contexts. It therefore appears that accepting and validating 
responses of people close to belief holders reduces distress (Heriot-Mairtland et 
 
 
85 
 
al., 2011) and helps individuals to develop strategies to more effectively manage 
negative, hostile responses in broader social contexts. 
 
deHaan et al. (2004) argued that families and close friends play a vital role in the 
identification of, and help seeking for, psychosis. This raises the question of how 
unusual ideas within the general population are understood by those close to 
belief holders. FFMP participants in the present investigation seemed to either 
endorse some aspects of claims or reported being open to ideas. The tendency 
for close others to at least accept claims is interesting. If, as deHaan et al. (2004) 
suggest, it is largely those around a person who label experiences as signs of 
psychosis, what is it that led participants within this research to not construct 
belief holders‘ claims as signs of psychosis? Arguably, those who also endorsed 
claims may have been motivated to understand ideas as reflecting an oppressed, 
marginalised truth that they too had discovered about the world. Taylor and 
Murray (2012) link family narratives to the positive acceptance of members‘ 
clairaudience experiences. It may be hypothesised that the unusual beliefs here 
resonated with participants‘ family and friends‘ narratives therefore leading to 
acceptance of claims.  
 
Three female FFMP participants reported being less willing to share ideas due to 
fear of being dismissed. In addition, when women participants expressed 
scepticism regarding claims, they attributed their uncertainty to emotional rather 
than logical reasons for example, accepting ideas but not wanting to believe they 
were true. Oliver (1991) discussed the powerful cultural construction of 
emotionality as an impediment to rational thinking. Perhaps FFMP participants 
drew on discourses of emotionality in order to minimise the potential conflict 
arising from their scepticism. Scepticism arising from emotionality may be less 
confrontational than arguments based on logic or rationality (Oliver, 1991). Thus, 
perhaps close others rely on emotion-based exploration claims, ensuring that 
they do not replicate the dismissal and hostility often experienced by belief 
holders in other contexts. 
 
Alice made explicit links to how sexism impacted on her reticence to share claims 
following experiences of being dismissed when sharing ideas (―they assume 
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that…you‘re a girl so you must be a bit thick‖). Oliver (1991) discussed the 
dichotomised stereotype of men as rational and therefore superior and women as 
irrational and therefore inferior. Perhaps women are doubly disadvantaged when 
sharing claims that do not accord with mainstream understandings, leading them 
to feel reluctant to share ideas. This is supported by the fact that only one belief 
holder participant interviewed as part of the research was a woman, with all other 
women participants being recruited as FFMP participants. Indeed, only four 
women made email contact regarding participation in the research. The three 
women not interviewed stated that they were unable to find FFMP participants to 
be interviewed with. This is interesting since endorsement of conspiracy theories 
and other unusual ideas has been found to be equally distributed amongst men 
and women (Peters et al., 1999) yet may indicate a difference in willingness to 
share claims in social contexts. Further exploration of the gender context of 
minority reality claims may be an interesting development of this research.  
 
How is any distress or conflict resulting from minority reality claims negotiated by 
belief holders and their friends, family members or partners? 
Distress or conflict regarding minority reality claims arose in various contexts. 
Some belief holder participants described times in which distress regarding ideas 
was experienced as overwhelming, leading to proselytising in potentially risky 
situations such as on trains. Peters et al. (2004) argued that higher levels of 
distress, preoccupation and conviction differentiated clinical from non-clinical 
populations. Participants‘ descriptions of distress seem somewhat at odds with 
this finding, implying that distress can be variable within a non-clinical population. 
Taylor and Murray (2012) suggested that distress and fear were common 
reactions to unusual experiences and that unusual experiences required 
explanation before they could be integrated into participants‘ lives. This echoes 
participants‘ descriptions of the temporal nature of distress and how important it 
is to create coherence between self and claims to prevent outbursts of distress.  
Thus, acknowledgement of the temporal nature of experiences seemed one way 
to allay moments in which distress was experienced as overwhelming.  
 
Conflict arising from sharing claims was reported to occur largely in social 
contexts with people unfamiliar to belief holder participants. Hostile, negative 
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responses were encountered at times when sharing claims. Participants 
appeared to counter negative responses by explaining the rejection of ideas by 
the majority of the population; further strengthening their argument that the truth 
is withheld from the masses. This appears linked with Tajfel‘s (1982) construction 
of in- and out-groups in which members of social groups identify with ‗similar‘ 
others and separate and denigrate ‗different‘ others. Participants‘ pejorative 
descriptions of mainstream, or ‗out-group‘, ideology may serve to reinforce their 
status within a marginal belief group, enhancing understandings of the ‗out-group‘ 
and diminishing distress experienced as a result of negative responses.  
 
Participants also de-personalised their ideas and distanced themselves from 
claims, for example, participants did not feel that conspiracies directly related to 
them but were at a national level. This may be considered consistent with Green, 
Freeman, Kuipers, Bebbington, Fowler, Dunn et al.‘s (2011) suggestion that 
personalising attribution styles are common in the severe rather than mild end of 
the paranoia-continuum. Discursively, de-personalising claims may serve to 
distance participants, allowing them to construct a dispassionate account and 
appeal to notions of science and rationality to validate claims.  
 
Seeking and meeting likeminded others also enabled participants to share ideas 
in a safe environment, limiting the desire to share ideas with sceptical others. 
Knowing that there was a community of people sharing ideas was cited by 
participants as an important factor in helping them manage the demoralising or 
distressing experiences associated with sharing claims. In addition, opportunities 
for meeting with like-minded individuals were described by participants as 
important, even if claims did not feature in the interaction. Taylor and Murray 
(2012) postulated that contact with others who had similar experiences may be 
important in the development of understandings of unusual experiences. Within a 
clinical context, May (2007) suggested that social isolation is problematic for 
many people accessing mental health services. May (2007) argued that 
increasing opportunities for social contact with others who share some 
commonalities is a beneficial way of enhancing mental health. Participants‘ 
accounts here support suggestions that social contact may be an important 
 
 
88 
 
aspect of managing claims both intra- and inter-personally, decreasing distress 
and isolation experienced as a result of claims. 
  
Evaluation of the research 
There is significant debate regarding the extent to which qualitative research can 
be evaluated and the most appropriate methods of evaluation (Spencer & Richie, 
2012). I have endeavoured to complete good quality research drawing on the 
evaluative criteria for qualitative research developed by Cohen and Crabtree 
(2008). The ethical implications of the research (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008) 
remained paramount throughout the interviews and analysis. Many participants 
expressed concerns that their ideas would be labelled as madness. I remained 
sensitive to this concern, using participants‘ language where possible throughout 
interviews and analysis. Cohen and Crabtree (2008) suggested research should 
be evaluated on the basis of contribution to the knowledge-base as well as 
pragmatic and theoretical utility. I hope that this research has contributed to the 
knowledge-base, elucidating accounts of belief formation and negotiation within 
non-clinical populations. There are some aspects of this research that are novel 
or unexpected including links with previous research as well as similarities and 
differences between this grounded theory model and previous research into 
delusions. Finally, the inclusion of a FFMP in the research design, to my 
knowledge, is unique. The theoretical and pragmatic utility (Crabtree & Cohen, 
2008) of this research is addressed in the following sections. Cohen and Crabtree 
(2008) argued that good quality qualitative research contains understandable, 
unexaggerated interpretation of the data. I have provided detail of the analysis 
process (Appendices 7-9) to promote transparency and enhance understanding.  
 
Researcher reflection  
Throughout the interviews, I attempted to remain open and curious about claims, 
adopting an agnostic position on ideas shared. Whilst I hoped that this approach 
would facilitate openness in participants, it seemed at times to somewhat impede 
the process. Many participants asked about my opinion and knowledge of claims, 
insisting that I should share my personal perspective. Whilst I acknowledged that 
I had encountered many ideas (such as conspiracies regarding 9/11 or alien 
presence), I was reticent to offer any evaluation of the claims, emphasising 
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instead my interest in participants‘ own perspectives. In some cases, it seemed 
that this impacted on the process as participants provided numerous examples 
perhaps in an attempt to persuade me of the veracity of their claims.  
 
My understanding and construction of the interviews often appeared at odds with 
participants‘. Whilst I attempted to emphasise my focus on the experience and 
negotiation of claims, participants seemed keen to provide detailed descriptions 
of beliefs. I experienced this at times as attempts to ‗convert‘ me into their 
worldview e.g. Glyn said ―you know how this affects you! Look in your heart‖ and 
Megan and Jack ended their interview by inviting me to a paranormal conference. 
Whilst this is only based on my experience and interpretation of the interviews 
and therefore may not reflect participants‘ experiences, if their motivations were 
to ‗convert‘ me, this may have impacted on what they did and did not share 
regarding claims. For example, participants predominantly talked about evidence 
supporting claims, ignoring or denigrating other possible interpretations. Future 
research may benefit from considering this potential dynamic. 
 
I was aware of my own ideas regarding the plausibility of claims. Some 
conspiracies mentioned by participants are culturally prevalent (e.g. 9/11 
conspiracies) however, I had not encountered other aspects of claims (e.g. 
telepathic alien communication) other than in the context of working in mental 
health services. My familiarity and previous experience of encountering claims 
(socially or in the context of mental health services) undoubtedly impacted on my 
evaluation of the feasibility of claims and may have impacted on the interview 
process. Participants reported an acute awareness of the reactions of others to 
claims so it is likely that at times, my lack of familiarity with claims impacted on 
how participants experienced me and what they shared during interviews. In 
addition, my status as a trainee clinical psychologist is likely to have further 
impacted the process, with many participants asking about my intentions for the 
research and whether I was planning to label their ideas as signs of madness. 
 
I noticed that my evaluations of claims directly after interviews (documented in a 
reflective diary) often changed following transcribing and analysing the data. At 
the time of interviews, claims seemed more plausible and less unusual than when 
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reading over transcripts. Perhaps this demonstrates the skilled way in which 
belief holders are able to socially negotiate their claims. My experience may also 
reflect how claims can be constructed interpersonally and how this aspect of 
negotiation may be altered when reading through transcripts. Awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, this was important when completing the analysis.  
 
I experienced a tension between my critical realist social constructionist 
epistemology and the apparently realist epistemology of the participants. 
Participants often drew on scientific discourses to validate their claims and 
appeared committed to constructing claims as reflecting an objective ‗reality‘, 
something hidden from most people. In addition, there were many discussions 
about how to describe or label claims. Participants appeared sensitive to 
constructions such as ‗beliefs‘ since they felt this undermined the validity of their 
ideas. Although social constructionist approaches enable researchers to 
accommodate agnostic approaches to unusual beliefs that are not overly 
preoccupied with whether a belief is true or not (Harper, 2004), this at times 
seemed to conflict with participants‘ apparent agenda to verify claims.    
 
Limitations  
As previously discussed, the criteria of only interviewing belief holders along with 
FFMP participants appeared to impact participation. The exclusion of potential 
participants not willing to be interviewed with a friend, family member or partner is 
a limitation to this research since these perspectives and understandings have 
been omitted. Future research would benefit from being mindful of this 
consideration. 
 
Glyn was interviewed twice as part of this research. This decision was made 
based upon John‘s limited contribution to the first interview with Glyn and 
predicted difficulties recruiting enough participants. Although beyond the remit of 
this research, it was interesting to observe Glyn negotiating his claims differently 
within different contexts. Interviewing people in different contexts about claims 
may elucidate aspects of the dynamic nature of claim negotiation. In an attempt 
to minimise the impact of interviewing Glyn twice, I ensured that his ideas were 
not overly represented in the category development. 
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An abbreviated version of grounded theory was used to analyse the data due to 
time limitations. Measures were taken to enhance the quality of the abbreviated 
version of the grounded theory, for example, line-by-line coding all interview 
transcripts (Willig, 2008). Despite this, the criticisms of abbreviated versions 
apply (Willig, 2008) and similar research would benefit from using the full version.  
 
Through descriptions of ‗beliefs‘ or ‗claims‘, I am potentially reifying constructs 
and implying that they are ‗real‘ aspects of internal experience. In addition, the 
focus of the research questions being on ‗intra-personal experiences‘ and 
‗distress or conflict‘ is based on assumptions that beliefs are mental constructs 
that lie within an individual and experiences of distress or conflict are inevitable. 
These are all problematic assumptions. Sampson (1993) acknowledged the 
difficulties with attempts to describe an aspect of experience without 
‗essentialising‘ it. It was not my intention to reify constructs such as beliefs, 
claims or intra-personal experiences. Instead, I hope this research enabled 
exploration of how participants construct their ideas in a context dominated by 
realist notions of ‗truth‘ and medicalised notions of ‗madness‘. 
 
The completion of the PDI was variable, with not all participants agreeing to 
complete it. Due to the small sample size, only tentative observations may be 
drawn from the data. Many participants found the questionnaire difficult to 
complete, particularly the Likert scale of conviction which participants deemed 
axiomatic following endorsing that they believed/had experienced items. In 
addition, many participants reported that items did not reflect their experiences of 
claims. Finally, two participants refused to complete the questionnaire after 
looking at it, stating that they felt that it sought to link endorsement with 
psychiatric diagnoses. It is possible that other participants experienced the 
questionnaire similarly and adapted their responses to ensure they were not 
pathologised.  
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Research implications 
Experiences of distress associated with minority reality claims within non-clinical 
populations would benefit from further research. Whilst some processes helpful to 
the management of distress have been explored here, further investigation would 
be interesting. Perhaps inclusion of people who could not identify someone who 
they would be willing to be interviewed with would further elaborate 
understandings regarding the experience and management of claims in non-
clinical populations.  
 
The gender context of claims highlighted by this research, with some female 
participants describing difficulties sharing ideas, is novel. Further exploration of 
the gender context both in clinical and non-clinical populations may be an 
interesting direction for future research.   
 
Participants‘ descriptions of the importance of logical interpersonal and emotional 
intra-individual validation of claims are interesting. Future research could focus 
on the different strategies used to validate claims and how participants decide 
which aspects of claims to share and how to validate them in different social 
contexts. 
 
Further exploration of how people close to belief holders construct and negotiate 
claims would be an interesting extension to this research. Since FFMP 
participants were interviewed conjointly with belief holders, it is possible that they 
did not feel able to talk openly about their experience and construction of claims. 
Whilst ethically challenging, individually interviewing people close to belief 
holders in the general population may reveal further insights into the construction 
and experience of claims. 
 
Clinical implications 
The importance of self-narrating claims and integrating claims into a person‘s 
sense of self seemed integral to many participant accounts. Thus, creating a 
coherent story that linked life experiences and personal attributes with claims 
seemed an important strategy to help participants reconcile old and new 
knowledge. Within mental health services, service users are often labelled 
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according to diagnostic categories, arguably restricting individuals‘ abilities to 
story their experiences. The difficulties experienced here in finding mutually 
agreeable terms to refer to claims provides further support for the potentially 
limiting and oppressive nature of psychiatric labels. Arguing from a service-user 
perspective, Campbell (2007) asserts that diagnosis can prevent individuals from 
authoring their experiences and understanding what led to their distress. Thus, 
rather than focusing on limiting diagnostic categories, empowering service users 
to make sense of their experiences and decide on how they construct them may 
help individuals create meaning and coherence within their lives and reduce the 
distress associated with experiences (Campbell, 2007). 
 
The importance of linking claims to life experiences is acknowledged within much 
psychological research into psychosis (e.g. Morrison, 2001). However, from this 
investigation, it appears that participant narratives about experiences contributing 
to the development of beliefs are complex and not easily subsumed into 
traditional psychological formulations. This implies that an individualised 
approach to narrating claims may be important to enable individuals to develop a 
sense of coherence and ultimately reduce the potential overwhelming experience 
of beliefs. Cromby and Harper (in press) discuss exploring metaphorical 
meanings of beliefs as well as pragmatic approaches to managing beliefs that 
may interfere with everyday life. Exploring the meaning of beliefs was 
demonstrated here to impact positively on a range of social and emotional 
processes. Thus rather than applying preconceived models of formulation, 
exploration of meaning may help service-users to integrate claims into their lives.  
 
Participants described developing an understanding regarding why other people 
rejected beliefs. This appeared an important coping strategy for managing 
scepticism and hostility when sharing claims. It may therefore be helpful to 
encourage individuals struggling with beliefs to consider why others might have a 
different perspective to their own. Within a clinical context, Knight (2005) 
suggested a number of creative ways to work within service-user‘s own reality 
including encouraging individuals to consider the reactions of others and adapting 
responses accordingly.  
 
 
 
94 
 
Knight‘s (2005) focus on working within client‘s own realities echoes many of the 
ideas described as helpful by belief holding participants. The importance of 
meeting with likeminded others was emphasised by participants and may 
therefore be beneficial for service users struggling with beliefs. Knight (2005) 
suggests that meeting with likeminded individuals provides service users with 
practical and emotional support as well as limiting the extent to which people feel 
isolated in their beliefs.  
 
Participants described various ways in which they managed overwhelming or 
distressing emotional experiences associated with beliefs which may have helpful 
clinical applications. For example, recognising the temporary nature of acute 
distress was described by participants as enabling them to resist urges to 
proselytise to others regarding claims. Acceptance and commitment therapy 
(Smith & Hayes, 2005) encourages individuals to accept the inevitability of 
distressing emotional experiences but to develop alternative ways of relating to 
associated thoughts and emotions. Such approaches may enhance service 
users‘ abilities to manage times when the emotional aspects of beliefs are 
experienced as overwhelming. 
 
Whilst further exploration would be beneficial, the gender context highlighted by 
some participants may have implications for clinical practice. It is possible that 
men and women have different experiences of sharing unusual beliefs socially. 
Sensitivity to this and exploration of the meaning for women may be helpful in 
clinical settings. 
 
The connections made by participants between the open, respectful attitude of 
those closest to them and developing strategies to negotiate claims may have 
clinical relevance. Encouraging an open, respectful approach to understanding 
beliefs may enable service users to develop more effective strategies for socially 
negotiating claims and managing distress. Cromby and Harper (in press) suggest 
that if distress and discomfort is experienced primarily within the system around a 
service-user, individuals might be encouraged to engage in groups relevant to the 
belief, reducing the need to talk to family members about unusual ideas. Family-
based interventions are recommended within NICE guidelines for the treatment of 
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people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (NICE, 2010). Seikkula, Alakare and 
Aaltonene (2001) developed an ‗Open Dialogue‘ approach to working with 
families. This approach uses a reflective team with families aiming to model 
acceptance of multiple interpretations of experiences and place difficult feelings 
in a meaningful context (Cromby & Harper, in press). This approach seems 
congruent with the positive experiences of close others described by belief holder 
participants.  
 
Finally, this grounded theory suggests that beliefs and understandings about the 
world are extremely varied within the general population. Mental health service 
users are among the most excluded individuals within society (ODPM, 2004) 
perhaps due to limited tolerance to expressions of emotion or ideas outside the 
‗norm‘. Thus, perhaps a community-based approach to unusual beliefs would 
promote the diversity of perspectives and beliefs held socially. Awareness of the 
multiplicity of ideas endorsed at a population level may foster greater tolerance to 
ideas traditionally constructed as unusual and reduce levels of exclusion. Whilst 
such a broad, educational approach would be complex, it is possible that a small 
shift in social attitudes may have a big impact on the lives and experiences of 
mental health service users.  
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Appendix 1: Peters et al (2004) Delusion Inventory (PDI) 
 
P.D.I.-21 
 
This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences.  
 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or 
wrong answers, and there are no trick questions. 
 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS. 
 
For the questions you answer YES to, we are interested in: 
 
(a) how distressing these beliefs or experiences are 
(b) how often you think about them; and 
(c) how true you believe them to be. 
 
On the right hand side of the page we would like you to circle the number which 
corresponds most closely to how distressing this belief is, how often you think about it, 
and how much you believe that it is true. 
 
If you answer NO please move on to the next question. 
 
Example 
 
Do you ever feel as if 
people are reading 
your mind? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                           absolutely 
true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
Do you ever feel as if 
you could read othe r 
people‘s minds? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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1. Do you ever feel as 
if people seem to drop 
hints or say things with 
a double meaning? 
 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
  
 
 
Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
2. Do you ever feel as 
if things in magazines 
of on TV were written 
especially for you? 
 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                           absolutely 
true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
3. Do you ever feel as 
if people are not what 
they seem to be? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
4. Do you ever feel as 
if you were being 
persecuted in some 
way? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
5. Do you ever feel as 
if there is a conspiracy 
against you? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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6. Do you ever feel as 
if you are, or destined 
to be someone very 
important? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
7. Do you ever feel 
that you are a very 
special or unusual 
person? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
8. Do you ever feel 
that you are especially 
close to God? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
9. Do you ever think 
that people can 
communicate 
telepathically? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
10. Do you ever feel 
as if electrical devices 
such as computers 
can influence the way 
you think? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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11. Do you ever feel 
as if you have been 
chosen by God in 
some way? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
12. Do you believe in 
the power of 
witchcraft, voodoo or 
the occult? 
 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
13. Are you often 
worried that you 
partner may be 
unfaithful? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
14. Do you ever feel 
that you have sinned 
more than the average 
person? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
15. Do you ever feel 
that people look at you 
oddly because of your 
appearance? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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16. Do you ever feel 
as if you had no 
thoughts in your head 
at all? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
17. Do you ever feel 
as if the world is about 
to end? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
18. Do your thoughts 
ever feel alien to you 
in some way? 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
19. Have your 
thoughts ever been so 
vivid that you were 
worried other people 
would hear them? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
20. Do you ever feel 
as if your own 
thoughts were echoed 
back to you? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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21. Do you ever feel 
as if you are a robot or 
zombie without a will 
of your own? 
 
 
NO   YES 
 
(please circle) 
 
 
 Not at all                                                    Very  
distressing                                              distressing 
       1              2              3              4              5 
  Hardly ever                                       Think about it 
think about it                                          all the time   
       1              2              3              4              5 
 Don‘t believe                                       Believe it is  
    it‘s true                                          absolutely true 
       1              2              3              4              5 
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Appendix 2: Letter confirming UEL School of Psychology ethical approval 
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Appendix 3: Metro advertisement  
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Appendix 4: List of internet forums contacted 
 
Name of forum Website address 
Scam www.scam.com 
Disclose TV www.disclose.tv 
Armageddon  Forums.armageddononline.org 
Truthed forums www.truthed.com/forum 
David Icke  Forum.davidicke.com 
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Appendix 5: Interview schedule 
 
The belief – questions for belief holder  
 Description of the belief  
 Factors that influenced development of the belief – initial interest, particular influences 
 Importance of the belief 
 
Sharing the belief/social negotiation – questions for belief holder only 
 In agreeing to participate in this research, you have identified your belief as unusual to 
others, what is it about your belief that others might find unusual? How do you know 
that others might feel this way about your belief? 
 Have you shared your belief with others in the past? How have people responded?  
 What happens if someone doesn’t share your belief? How do you manage this? How 
does it make you feel to know that others do not share your belief? 
 Do you think that many other people share your ideas? 
 
Friend, family member or partner’s perspective – questions for friend, family member or partner 
 Do you share (belief holder’s name) belief?  
 YES: can you tell me a bit about your understanding of the belief? Do you think that it is 
important that you share the same belief? What might happen if you did not share the 
belief? 
 NO: what is it like to be close to someone who holds a different understanding to your 
own? Does it ever cause any conflict? How do you manage the difference in beliefs? 
 
Understanding of the belief – questions for friend, family member or partner 
 Are there any aspects of the belief that you find unusual in some way? Do you think that 
others might find (belief holder’s name) belief unusual? How have others responded to 
(belief holder’s name) belief? In what ways do you think others might understand the 
belief?  
 Do you talk to other’s about (belief holder’s name) belief? Why not/how do they 
respond?  
 
Emotional responses to the belief – questions for both belief holder (BH) and friend, family 
member or        partner (FFP) 
 BH - Holding a belief that is important to you might make you feel a range of different 
emotions (e.gs). Can you describe any emotions that you have experienced as a result of 
your belief? How do you manage these emotions (e.g. talking to others)? How do others 
respond? 
 FFP - Does (belief holder) talk to you about the feelings that they experience as a result 
of their beliefs? What do you do when (belief holder) talks to you about their feelings? 
Do you ever experience an emotional reaction to the belief? How do you manage your 
own emotional responses?  
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Appendix 6: Transcription conventions  
 
Adapted from Bannister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall (1994): 
 
Symbol  Explanation  
P1: thinking I was <I: mmm> somewhere 
 
 
 
Indicates overlapping speech where the 
interruption does not affect the flow of the 
speaker‘s speech. 
P2: during the war [World War 2] Square brackets indicate author‘s 
description rather than transcriptions 
P1: Yes (.) maybe that Full stop in closed brackets indicates 
slight pause 
P2: It all started (2) a very long time ago Number in brackets indicates a two 
second pause (number indicates 
duration) 
P1: it was everywhere Underlined text indicates emphasis  
P2: I don‘t know (laughs) Indicates speaker laughed 
P1: I think it was…sometime in 
December 
Ellipsis indicates part of the speech (no 
more than 40 words) has been removed 
from the extract as it was not deemed 
relevant to the illustrated point. 
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Appendix 7: Example of line-by-line coding
Roshan: well that’s, that’s the harder question to answer but, um 75 
essentially people who have power are very reluctant to relinquish 76 
that power so I imagine whoever that might be, whether it’s, I don’t 77 
necessarily think it’s the US government because I think they are 78 
puppets of something else. Um, so you know, I’m not, I guess some 79 
people are anti-Semitic or something, that all the Jews control the 80 
world or whatever, it’s not even that, maybe that’s a part of it, or 81 
it’s just simply, just the wealthy, whoever they might be, whatever 82 
race, religion, nationality, just that kind of group of elite. You know, 83 
or maybe it’s the royal family involved in it because you never really 84 
know, because obviously these (.) families or influential people have 85 
very deep roots in, you know generations of wealth and power 86 
rather than someone who’s, started a company and made a few 87 
billion, that’s not the same level of influence over society and 88 
culture so, so, who exactly I think is behind it is not very clear but, 89 
um… 90 
Louise: do you think it is possible that it is, kind of, a group of 91 
people, that it’s a conscious thing or is it… 92 
Roshan: um, yes and (.), yes and no because I think, just simply, it’s 93 
just human nature to be like that because, you know, I guess we are 94 
animals and it’s survival of the fittest and that’s the way I guess 95 
humans are, but then because there are so few people that have 96 
that kind of power, surely they deal with each other. Even if maybe 97 
they’re competitors in business, for example, um, I don’t know, like 98 
Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi are competitors because they 99 
have got competing companies but essentially their agenda for 100 
power and control and wealth is the same, so (.) surely they have 101 
some kind of, you know, they’re not out to kill each other kind of 102 
thing, they’re not like drug barons that are, um, at the end of the 103 
day, they’ve got a common interest, they’re just trying to get a 104 
bigger slice of the same pie but the pie is equally of interest to both 105 
of them… 106 
 
Hard to answer [who 
manipulates media] 
Powerful are reluctant to 
relinquish [power] 
Imagining whoever it might be 
 
Not thinking it’s the US govt 
 
Thinking US govt are puppets. 
Guessing  
Linking anti-Semitic ideas about 
Jewish control and conspiracies 
Rejecting anti-Semitism; 
questioning if may be part of it 
Simplifying just to the wealthy 
and questioning who they are 
Stating that regardless they are 
the elite 
Perhaps royal family involved 
Families or influential people 
 
Having deep roots; generations 
of wealth and power 
Contrasting with an 
entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur not having as 
much social influence 
Thinking it is not very clear who 
is behind it 
 
 
Asking if it is possibly a group 
If it is a conscious thing 
 
 
Expressing uncertainty 
 
believing it to be human nature 
 
thinking we are animals; linking 
to survival of the fittest  
thinking due to few people 
having 
power must deal with each 
other 
even business competitors; 
being unsure 
linking media competitors 
competing companies 
essentially sharing agendas 
wanting power and control 
 
believing they’re not out to kill 
each other 
differentiating from drug 
barons 
common interests uniting 
 
interest in pie [power] being 
the same 
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Appendix 8: Example of focused coding 
 
Glyn: but I, I think we have power to speak and we have power to 156 
learn. You teach yourself and then one way or another, you pass on 157 
information, you’ve made, I might not do it well, I rant, I shout, I 158 
argh! Too much information <Louise: mmm> but then you can email 159 
people, you can give them information on a disk but you get them to 160 
see the things you’ve seen <Louise: yeah> because I didn’t know 161 
until I saw it <Louise: mmm> and then it’s obvious (.) you know, the 162 
problem is economic control, that we’re not given free access to 163 
land so we can live peacefully on our own land and to grow our own 164 
food to, to downscale, people are kept in debt and that’s the big 165 
crisis right now, is the banking thing, that’s come to a head, that has 166 
been predicted by all these conspiracy theorists as they’re called or 167 
we’re called <Louise: yeah> for years! And I, I, they predicted, 168 
they’ve told, everything that they’ve said, everything for 20 years, 169 
everything, even to the price of gold coming to where it is, has come 170 
true, everything <Louise: mmm> every single thing, including 9/11 171 
before it happened, every single thing. It, I could show you the 172 
documents from years ago, they, was already stated 173 
Identifying where 
action can be 
taken 
Identifying how to 
(/not) talk 
Idea/concept 
simple/obvious 
Validating 
claims through 
reference to 
external 
sources 
Using the internet 
to validate claims 
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Appendix 9: Example memo 
 
Date: 28/01/2012 
 
‗Wanting to share ideas but not wanting to appear mad‘ – focused code/category? 
 
Liam and Alice (lines 766-780) – Liam describes how ideas can be discredited through 
aligning them with a crazy person e.g. David Icke. Thus, even though others with 
credibility and intelligence may find out the same truths, no one will want to 
listen/publicise ideas because ―the nutter‘s already been screaming about it‖. This is 
making me think about a balancing act of acknowledgement that ideas can be easily 
diminished to insane nonsense (with not only ideas but you being labelled as such) 
against a desire to seek out/tell others about the truth. 
Participants describe acute awareness of the potential for ridicule and exclusion through 
being labelled as mad (?predicting reaction of others rather than testing out – seems that 
participants are describing initially not talking due to the fear that others would label and 
ridicule them. Sometimes this can be based on previous experience (e.g. Jack talking 
about aliens as a child) but seems to mostly be based on predicted responses). Reading 
through Peter and Sue‘s transcript, this appears particularly evident in Sue‘s account 
?perhaps there is more awareness of the potential for labelling in those who don‘t 
endorse beliefs? 
Possible category – acknowledging and resisting exclusion although this doesn‘t seem to 
fit with the desire to share ideas described by most participants – Olga and Glyn both 
discuss this compulsion leading to making announcements about claims on trains 
although this appears linked with feeling emotionally overwhelmed by ideas and ideas 
‗bursting out‘.  
 
